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ABSTRACT
This study examines how the components o f  CEO compensation contracts vary 
with characteristics o f initial public offering firms (IPOs). There are two major steps 
in the analysis. The first step investigates whether IPOs exhibit variation in 
characteristics that theory predicts affect compensation contracts. The second step 
investigates whether these differences across firms are related to the use o f  accounting 
versus non-accounting performance evaluation measures, levels o f base salary and 
cash bonuses, and the value o f stock options for CEOs. Results from this study 
support the importance o f modeling compensation components separately. Theoretical 
constructs differ depending on the type o f compensation being explained. This 
separation allows more powerful inferences than are possible in studies that combine 
the components.
The use o f accounting earnings in incentive compensation contracts has been 
well documented for large firms. Accounting numbers are useful when they signal the 
value added by the manager. For IPOs that are creating or exercising growth options 
by investment in research and development or advertising, accounting numbers may be 
less informative, which leads to a  substitution o f  stock-based incentives for income- 
based incentives. This is the first study to examine the relative importance o f 
accounting-based compensation for firms that are going public. For the analyses, IPOs 
are classified by the observable characteristics o f  their investment opportunity sets 
(IOS). This includes an examination o f  the relations among growth, ex ante risk, and 
ex post risk. Cross-sectional variation in IOS measures such as size, growth, risk, and
iv
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firm performance are supported by the data and this variation partly explains cross- 
sectional differences in compensation contracts. Results from tests that include CEO 
characteristics and equity ownership are clearly inconsistent with CEO opportunism. 
Also, the results are generally consistent with efficient contracting.
v
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study examines how the components o f chief executive officer (CEO) 
compensation contracts vary with characteristics o f  initial public offering firms (IPOs). 
There are two major steps in the analysis. The first step investigates whether IPOs 
exhibit variation in characteristics that theory predicts affect compensation contracts. 
The second step investigates whether these differences across firms are related to the 
use o f accounting versus non-accounting performance evaluation measures, levels o f 
base salary and cash bonuses, and the value o f  stock options for CEOs.
Most compensation research focuses on samples of large, seasoned firms 
because o f  the difficulty in obtaining compensation data for smaller firms. Large firms 
generally have long operating histories. Further, although dispersed among different 
industries, such samples are heavily weighted towards firms with relatively large 
proportions o f assets in place. Such firms use accounting numbers for performance 
evaluation because they reflect the effort and ability o f the manager [Sloan (1993)].
In contrast to large firms, the structure o f  compensation contracts in small firms, 
especially IPOs, is largely unexplored. Yet IPOs provide important contrasts to 
seasoned public firms. First, the process o f  taking a firm public entails major 
corporate control changes. These changes encourage the review o f  current contracts, 
and, perhaps, the addition o f  new contracts to better align managerial incentives with 
the changed focus and environment o f the firm. Thus, compensation contracts in IPOs 
are “current”, i.e., new or recently changed. An examination o f 111 offering 
prospectuses, executive employment agreements, and stock option plans, confirms that
1
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managerial incentives for IPOs are current. In contrast, since recontracting is costly, it 
is less likely that contracts are revised each year for seasoned firms. Therefore, 
contracts o f  seasoned firms may be less informative if the compensation incentives for 
these firms are not current.1
Second, monitoring issues are different for IPOs because managers and directors 
o f  IPOs have larger ownership percentages than managers and directors o f  large firms. 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) report that median equity ownership percentages 
for CEOs o f large firms is 0.10% compared to 10.2% for this study. Cyert, Kang, and 
Shah (1997) find ownership by officers and directors (excluding the CEO) to be 4.88% 
for a sample o f large and small firms versus 26.2% for this study. Thus, equity 
ownership may play a more important role in IPOs than it does in large, seasoned 
firms with low CEO ownership.2 This is because equity ownership provides a 
substitute incentive mechanism that is particularly useful when accounting numbers 
are poor measures o f managerial performance.
Accounting earnings have a  dual role. They provide information that is useful in 
valuing the firm (decision-making) and that is useful to owners and debtholders for use 
in monitoring and evaluating the performance o f  management (stewardship) [Gjesdal 
(1981)]. Paul (1992) shows that performance evaluation should be based on firm- 
specific events that are under the manager’s control and that reflect the value added by
1 Large firm samples after 1993 may have revised contracts if the firms were affected by the $ 1 million 
cap on tax deductibility o f compensation imposed by the Revenue Reconciliation Act o f 1993.
2 One must be careful comparing ownership percentages across firms since small percentages of large 
firms could exceed large percentages o f small firms as a percentage o f managers' wealth.
2
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the manager. Accounting numbers may not be useful for performance evaluation for 
many IPOs because of losses associated with early stages o f  operation and investment 
in growth opportunities. IPOs tend to have relatively high fixed operating costs, 
including research and development (R&D) and advertising. Since these types of 
expenditures are expensed immediately, tying managerial performance evaluation to 
accounting earnings for IPOs may be counterproductive. Such a  tie encourages 
managers to cut R&D, advertising, or other discretionary expenditures to increase 
accounting earnings rather than to increase firm value. Therefore, stock-based 
incentive compensation may play a more important role in IPOs than it does in large, 
seasoned firms.
Results from this study confirm that, except for the largest firms, accounting 
numbers are used less frequently in evaluating managers. Using a sample o f 111 firms 
that went public between May 1996 and February 1998, this study finds that all o f  the 
firms either have a stock option plan in place prior to the offering or have designed a 
plan to be implemented on the date o f the offering. Ninety percent o f the firms have 
cash bonus plans, but very few of the employment agreements, even if new or revised, 
disclose the actual performance criteria used in determining awards. This suggests 
that the boards o f directors retain discretion in making bonus awards and thus, 
executive compensation is not mechanically tied to accounting earnings for these 
firms.
Theory predicts that compensation contracts vary systematically with 
characteristics o f firms that are collectively referred to as the firm's investment
3
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opportunity set (IOS). A firm’s IOS is defined as its prospective investment 
opportunities and associated payoff distributions [Smith and Watts (1992)]. 
Variations in a firm's IOS are driven by firm-specific investment in “specialized 
physical and human capital” [Smith and Watts (1992)]. A  firm's IOS is 
multidimensional, and includes the type o f  knowledge the firm produces, production 
and information externalities among a firm's investments, technological and demand 
uncertainty, regulation, type o f customers and employees, asset specificity, product 
and other tortious liabilities, and tax structure (domestic and foreign) [Christie, Joye 
and Watts (1998); Christie (1998)]. Christie, Joye and Watts (1998) argue that several 
o f these IOS characteristics are related to size, growth, and risk.
Prior research examines the relation between executive compensation and 
several aspects o f  firms' IOS, such as size, growth, and risk. Gaver and Gaver (1993), 
Clinch (1991), Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993), and Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang 
(1996) classify firms as low or high growth. This high or low growth classification is 
used to analyze differences in executive compensation between these two categories. 
Essentially all prior compensation studies use size as a control variable.
This study also uses size, growth and risk as relevant IOS characteristics. 
However, in contrast to prior research, this study examines these differing IOS 
characteristics in a sample o f IPOs. Lang (1991) reports that IPOs are, on average, 
high growth and high risk, but they are not homogeneous. He finds considerable 
differences in firm characteristics such as size, age, proceeds, revenue, book value of 
equity, and risk. Results from this study confirm that IPOs are not homogeneous, but
4
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have cross-sectional variation in numerous firm characteristics. Some o f  these 
characteristics are size, growth opportunities, length o f operating history, risk, and 
firm performance.
An additional contribution o f  this study is the identification o f risk measures that 
represent both an ex ante and ex post focus. IPO prospectuses disclose risk factors that 
may affect each firm. These risk factors are an ex ante measure. Conversely, an ex 
post measure o f risk is the volatility o f  stock returns. This identification allows an 
analysis of ex ante risk and its relation to ex post risk, i.e., stock return volatility. The 
results indicate that the number o f risk factors is a  significant predictor o f volatility 
and that the relation has diminished through time. This finding has important 
implications for SEC policy-makers and the investment community.
The primary growth measure used by researchers is the market to book ratio.3 
This proxy measures growth with error. This ratio is likely to be different for an IPO 
sample as compared to a sample o f seasoned firms for two reasons. First, using 
depreciation-adjusted historical cost for property, plant and equipment, can cause the 
book value o f firms with long lived assets to differ significantly from the replacement 
cost of existing production capacity. If the average age of depreciable assets is lower 
for IPOs, then a sample o f IPOs, which generally includes younger firms, may reduce 
this measurement error. Second, IPOs also have a  larger proportion o f expenditures in 
R&D, which is expensed for accounting purposes. If some o f these expenditures have
3 This ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value o f debt divided by the book value o f  total
assets.
5
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a future benefit, then the denominator o f the market to book ratio is downward biased 
and the ratio itself is upward biased. Thus, this study provides insight into using the 
market to book ratio as a  proxy for growth for firms which (1) have younger assets in 
place, and (2) have relatively high R&D.
To provide additional insights into the effect o f the IOS on compensation 
contracts, two other approaches to capturing salient features o f  the IOS are also used. 
First, examination of the uses o f the proceeds disclosed in the offering prospectuses 
permits assessment o f whether IPOs are creating or exercising growth options. The 
categorization o f the uses o f IPO proceeds provides an additional proxy for growth that 
is not usually available for large, seasoned firms. The categorization o f the uses of 
IPO proceeds is related to the size o f the offering, the types o f assets being managed, 
the age of the firm and firm risk.
Second, IPOs are classified based on their years o f prior operating history. This 
classification segregates IPOs into mature firms (five or more years o f operating 
history) and start-up firms (less than five years o f operating history). In both cases, 
firms are categorized based on observable data. These classifications provide insights 
about the IOS and differences among IPOs that are related to compensation contract 
differences.
For the sample, classification based on years o f prior operating history results in 
75 mature firms and 36 start-ups. Within the group o f 75 mature firms, there is a 
subgroup with unique characteristics. This subgroup is known as roll-ups, which are 
previously unrelated firms that merge contemporaneously with the offering. By
6
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definition, roll-ups are multidivisional firms, and have more complex monitoring and 
incentive problems than firms that are a  single operating unit. Eighteen o f  the 75 
mature firms are classified as roll-ups. This classification scheme is empirically useful 
in understanding incentive compensation, i.e., bonuses and stock option values.
In summary, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, 
hypotheses on variations in firm characteristics by IPO type are tested. Unlike prior 
IPO studies, this study does not assume that IPOs are homogeneous. Results from the 
study confirm this. Second, using firm-specific data on cash salary, cash bonus, and 
the value o f stock options, this study examines hypotheses regarding the expected 
relation between IOS and the components o f CEO compensation. Testing the 
components separately is important because theory underlying fixed and incentive 
compensation is different. Additionally, the study analyzes predictions about the 
effect o f certain CEO characteristics and equity ownership on compensation. Results 
are clearly inconsistent with CEO opportunism.
Overall, the results indicate that CEO base salaries are increasing in the size o f 
the firm, CEO equity ownership, and CEO tenure, but decreasing when the CEO is 
also a founder. Salaries for roll-ups and start-ups don’t seem to be significantly 
different from those o f  other mature firms. Cash incentive compensation (bonuses) is 
increasing in size and officers’ and directors’ equity ownership but decreasing for roll­
ups and start-ups. In addition, ROA for the largest one-third o f  the sample firms is 
positively associated with cash bonuses. This supports the idea that accounting 
information is useful for performance evaluation when it reflects the value added by
7
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the manager [Gjesdai (1981); Paul (1992)]. As expected, stock option values are 
increasing in growth opportunities, especially for start-up firms. The results are 
generally consistent with efficient contracting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the theory and development 
o f hypotheses on the classification o f  IPOs, growth, uses o f proceeds, and risk, and 
variation in CEO compensation contracts. Section 3 describes the sample selection, 
descriptive statistics, and variables collected for the study. The fourth section presents 
the empirical methodology and findings for the study. The fifth section contains a 
brief summary, discusses the benefits and limitations o f the sample, and offers 
suggestions for future research.
8
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
This section reviews the relevant theoretical literature and develops testable 
hypotheses related to CEO compensation for IPOs. The first subsection presents 
background information on IPOs and discusses expected differences among IPO firm 
characteristics. These differences lead to the development o f a  two- and three-level 
classification scheme that is explained in section 2.1.1. The second subsection 
discusses the relation between growth, risk, and the use o f the proceeds from the IPO. 
The planned use of proceeds provides additional information on growth prospects that 
is unique to IPOs. The third subsection discusses compensation theory and develops 
hypotheses on the relations between compensation and investment opportunities, CEO 
characteristics, and IPO classifications.
2.1 Sample Structure
The bulk of previous research into IPOs focuses on the role o f underwriters, 
underpricing, and long-term performance. First, the literature characterizes IPOs as 
young growth firms with a high degree o f uncertainty [Loughran (1993)]. IPOs are 
also characterized by high information asymmetry between issuers (original owners) 
and investors. Little publicly available information exists for a private firm, so 
investors must rely heavily on the information disclosed in the offering prospectus. 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) call the uncertainty an investor has about the value o f EPO 
stock, “ex ante uncertainty.” They use two proxies for ex ante uncertainty. The first 
proxy is the number of uses of proceeds disclosed in the prospectus. They use this 
proxy because the SEC “requires more speculative issues to provide relatively detailed
9
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enumerations o f  the uses o f  proceeds.” The second proxy they employ is the inverse 
o f the gross proceeds from the offering. Their reasoning is that this proxy “captures 
the empirical regularity that smaller offerings are more speculative, on average, than 
large offerings.” Although their focus is on underpricing, in regressions where the 
dependent variable is the initial stock return, they interpret the positive coefficients on 
these two proxies as an indication that investors positively correlate these measures 
with ex ante uncertainty.
Second, studies that examine the long-run performance o f  IPOs find that 
operating performance declines as these firms season [Ibbotson (1975); Ritter (1991); 
Loughran and Ritter (1995)]. One possible explanation for the underperformance o f 
IPOs is that agency costs increase as the percentage o f managerial ownership 
decreases.4 Explanatory variables used in these studies include firm-specific 
characteristics such as size and age o f firm [Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997)]. 
However, few prior studies control for other IOS characteristics such as growth and 
risk.
Finally, the process o f  going public means that these firms exhibit substantial 
dilution in managerial ownership. This dilution occurs both at the time o f the EPO and 
as IPOs season. In a study o f IPOs from 1980-1983, Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that 
the median ownership stake o f  the CEO and other officers and directors decreases
4 On the other hand, firms like IBM have low managerial ownership percentages and are successful. As 
stated earlier, small ownership percentages o f large firms can have large effects on CEO wealth.
10
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from 67.9% to 43.7% at the time o f  the IPO. After five years, the median stake has 
decreased to 28.6% and after ten years, this number declines to 17.9%.
This study contributes to the IPO literature by examining cross-sectional 
differences among IPOs, and determining whether these differences explain variation 
in compensation contracts. The paper classifies IPOs in two ways: by years o f 
operating history, and by the uses o f the offering proceeds. Further, this paper 
examines an interesting subset o f  IPOs: roll-ups. A roll-up is unique because it 
represents a  group o f previously unrelated firms that merge at the time of the offering. 
These IPO classifications are discussed in the following section.
2.1.1 IPO Type Descriptions and Predictions
If all characteristics o f a firm's IOS were observable, these measures could be 
used directly to examine differences among firms. Since this is not the case, and 
proxies must be employed, this study develops a classification scheme to test if  the 
categories provide any additional evidence on differences among IPOs.
Most IPO studies use two age measures to differentiate IPOs. One measure is 
the number of years o f  operating history as disclosed in the prospectus, which 
separates firms into those with over five years o f operations and those with less than 
five years [Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997)]. The second measure is the number 
o f years between incorporation and the IPO. However, the reliability o f this second
It
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measure is questionable, since examination o f  prospectuses indicates than many of 
these firms reincorporate prior to the offering.5
This study uses years o f  operating history to differentiate IPOs. Firms with less 
than five years o f  operating history are classified as start-ups; and, those with five or 
more years o f operating history are classified as mature. Both groups can be single 
firms or firms that have previously combined with other firms (either through 
acquisitions and/or mergers). There is a subset o f mature firms called roll-ups. As 
noted in the previous section, a roll-up is unique because it represents a group of 
previously unrelated firms that merge at the time o f the offering. Roll-ups are more 
complex organizations than start-ups and other mature firms. The purpose of this 
classification scheme is to test whether the categories provide additional evidence on 
differences among IPOs. If there are systematic differences among IPOs based on this 
classification, then this approach may allow further isolation o f the firm's IOS. This 
increases the power o f  subsequent tests o f association between IOS and compensation 
variables.
Start-up firms are generally found in high technology industries and invest 
heavily in human capital and R&D. Prior studies on seasoned firms (non-IPO) have 
developed measures o f  growth based on the amount o f  R&D expenditures, but a  good 
proxy for the investment in human capital has not been developed. Start-ups are likely
5 Many firms become Delaware corporations.
12
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to have a  lower volume o f  sales, higher initial operating costs, or a  more aggressive 
pricing strategy than mature IPOs [Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997)].
Based on the limited operating history o f  start-ups, they should be smaller in size 
than mature firms. Relevant size measures include sales, book value o f assets, market 
value o f equity, and the size o f the offering. This anticipated negative relation 
between classification as a  start-up and firm size also applies to computed variables 
that are monotonic transformations o f  these size-related variables.
Many start-up firms invest heavily in R&D. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) require that R&D expenditures be expensed in the period incurred 
rather than capitalized. This accounting rule in combination with low sales volume 
and high initial fixed operating costs implies that the earnings o f  start-ups will be low 
or possibly negative. Therefore, income-based performance measures for start-ups are 
expected to be less useful than for mature firms.
The growth options o f start-ups are considerable. Growth drives the demand for 
external financing which motivates an IPO. Not only are start-ups in positions to 
exercise growth options, but to create them through new investments as well. 
Therefore, it is predicted that growth proxies are greater for start-ups. This prediction 
is partly due to the observation that start-ups have fewer assets-in-place; therefore, the 
denominator of the growth proxy, book value o f  assets, is smaller.
Although all IPOs are considered risky investments, start-ups have more ex ante 
uncertainty due to their limited operating histories. Each IPO prospectus must disclose 
a listing o f risk factors that may be applicable to each firm. Examples o f risk factors
13
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include: reliance on major customers, competition in the company's markets,
fluctuations in quarterly operating results, control by principal stockholders, 
dependence on key personnel, absence o f prior trading market, and possible volatility 
o f stock price. Using the number o f  risk factors listed in the IPO prospectus as a  proxy 
for ex ante risk, start-ups are expected to have a greater number o f these factors. An ex 
post risk measure is the volatility o f  stock returns. Start-ups are expected to be more 
volatile than mature firms.
Mature firms represent IPOs with relatively longer operating histories, more 
assets-in-place, and larger size. Frequently, the original private owner o f a mature 
firm becomes the CEO/Chairman o f the Board at the time of, or prior to, going public 
and retains considerable ownership in the company. On the other hand, some mature 
firm owners may use the IPO as an opportunity to cash cut o f their prior investment, 
resulting in lower retained ownership and limited future management roles.
A subset o f the mature firms is known as roll-ups. This group o f firms, which 
are previously unrelated and merge contemporaneously with the public offering, 
present a unique setting for analyzing agency problems and corporate governance 
issues. These firms are usually in the same or closely related industries and 
presumably consolidate operations for synergistic reasons. The size o f roll-up firms 
varies and is dependent on whether the "founding companies" are o f relatively large 
size or whether they are small firms that are merging to be large enough for an IPO. 
Roll-ups are likely to have less externalities among units o f the firm than single unit 
firms and more profit centers [Christie, Joye, and Watts (1998)]. Although roll-ups do
14
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not have operating histories as combined firms, for this study at least one o f  the 
individual firms is mature (over five years o f  operations).
The evidence presented later is that these firms frequently contract with an 
outside manager to oversee the consolidation o f  these various businesses. The 
previous owners o f the individual companies then have management roles at the 
subsidiary or division level, since that is where their expertise lies. These prior owners 
are often members o f the board o f  directors and have considerable retained ownership.
It is also likely that a  new outside manager hired to head the firm owns a  much 
smaller percentage o f the resulting company stock than do the previous owners. 
Therefore, these roll-up firms are more likely to face the agency problems found in 
seasoned public firms. Interests of manager-shareholders and other shareholders 
become less closely aligned as the manager’s stake decreases and ownership becomes 
more diluted. Roll-ups appear to be more complex, relative to other IPOs, with the 
potential for greater monitoring costs and differential compensation.
2.2 Growth, Use o f Proceeds, and Risk
Each IPO prospectus includes a section titled "Use o f Proceeds". This section 
lists specific uses and related dollar amounts for the proceeds from the offering. An 
examination of the planned uses of the capital raised by the IPO provides additional 
information about the firm's investment opportunities and decisions.
There are many reasons why a firm chooses to go public. The cash infusion can 
be used for a variety o f purposes, but two primary purposes are: (1) to finance 
investment for expansion, and (2) to retire debt. An IPO must list its uses o f proceeds
15
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in the offering prospectus. Examining these uses provides insight into the firm’s 
growth plans and prospects.
This study categorizes the uses o f proceeds from the offering into four groups. 
This is done to examine the relation between the uses o f proceeds from the offering 
and the growth proxy.6 The presence (1,0) o f  a particular use disclosed for each firm 
is collected and categorized as: (1) creating growth options, (2) exercising growth 
options, (3) retiring debt, and (4) other uses. The “creating growth options” category 
represents a firm’s planned use for R&D. The “exercising growth options” category 
includes planned uses for working capital, capital expenditures, current and future 
acquisitions, sales and marketing, and general corporate purposes. The “other uses” 
category includes uses for S-corporation distributions, letters o f credit, reorganization 
costs, and preferred dividends.
The first two categories o f planned uses, “creating growth options” and 
“exercising growth options,” are future oriented. Thus, positive relations with the 
growth proxy are expected for both categories. The third category, “retiring debt,” is 
related to correcting the capital structure o f the firm. The relation between debt and 
growth has both a mathematical and economic explanation. The mathematical relation 
is based on changes in the growth proxy when debt is decreased. Both the numerator 
and denominator o f the proxy decrease and if  the growth proxy is greater than I prior 
to debt retirement, growth will decrease after debt retirement. From an economic
6 The growth proxy is (market value o f equity + book value o f debt) / book value of assets.
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perspective, high growth firms are expected to have low debt because (a) human 
capital and R&D expenditures are poor collateral, (b) stock return volatility is high for 
these firms, and (c) debt covenants inhibit change [Smith and Watts (1992)]. Since the 
retirement o f debt only effects the growth proxy after the retirement occurs, the 
disclosure o f such a use o f  proceeds is not expected to have any relation with growth. 
Except for letters o f  credit, examples o f uses that are included in the “other uses” 
category are backward looking. Therefore, this category is not expected to be related 
to growth.
2.2.1 Risk and Proceeds
The uses o f  proceeds convey information about firms future plans for 
investments. These growth plans are also related to risk, i.e., the types o f investments 
a firm makes affects the riskiness o f the firm. Therefore, firm-specific risk is 
endogenous.
A proxy for ex ante risk that is examined in this study is the number o f risk 
factors listed in the prospectus [Feltham, Hughes and Simunic (1991)]. Over the 
years, the SEC has changed their recommendations and rules regarding the number 
and types o f risk factors to disclose, hi Ritter (1991), a  number o f  firms had zero risk 
factors disclosed. The minimum number o f risk factors in this study is eleven. 
Examination of the actual risk factors in this sample indicates that there are many 
factors that every firm includes in their prospectus. This increase in "boilerplate" risk 
factors may decrease the variability between firms or just shift the mean. Examples o f 
"boilerplate" factors are dilution o f ownership, dependence on key personnel,
17
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fluctuations in operating results, absence o f  prior trading market, broad management 
discretion in allocation o f net proceeds, shares eligible for future sale, and anti­
takeover provisions. Therefore, an alternative proxy for ex ante risk (or uncertainty) is 
tested. This proxy is the number o f  uses o f  proceeds listed in the prospectus [Beatty 
and Ritter (1986)]. Beatty and Ritter (1986) use this measure because the SEC 
requires riskier issuers to provide more detail on the uses o f  proceeds.
Stock return volatility is used as an ex post risk measure. The number o f post- 
IPO monthly stock returns used in calculations ranges from 9 to 30 months, with a 
median o f  21 months. If  the ex ante measures o f risk perform as the SEC would like 
them to, they should explain ex post risk, volatility. Therefore, this relation is 
examined. Growth is included in these tests because o f the link between risk and 
growth.
2 3  Compensation
Compensation contracts are used to help align the interests o f  management with 
those o f  shareholders. In the manager-shareholder contract, the owner-manager is 
viewed as the agent and the shareholder as the principal. Principals are concerned 
with the manager’s contribution, via effort or ability, toward maximizing the value of 
the firm. The agency problem arises because the principal has limited observability o f 
the agent’s actions and must therefore impute the agent’s actions based on outcomes 
[Jensen and Meckling (1976)].
The limited observability o f effort implies an uneven information environment 
between principals and agents. Therefore, perfect risk-sharing between the principal
18
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and agent is not possible because the agent’s welfare depends on the output achieved 
[Holmstrom (1979)]. An agent must be compensated for bearing this additional risk. 
When the contract goals are to align the manager’s incentives with those o f the 
shareholder, agency costs arise because managers have to be compensated for bearing 
additional risk [Antle and Smith (1985)].
In summary, this section discusses theoretical issues related to compensation 
contracting. The compensation function discussed in the next three subsections is 
modeled as:
CEO Compensation = /  (IOS, CEO Characteristics, IPO Types).
Predictions are made about the relations between CEO compensation and IOS, i.e., 
size, growth, firm performance, and risk; CEO compensation and CEO characteristics 
and ownership, i.e., whether the CEO is Chairman of the Board, equity ownership of 
the CEO, equity ownership o f directors and officers, CEO tenure, and whether the 
CEO is a founder; and, CEO compensation and IPO classifications, i.e., whether the 
firm is a roll-up or a start-up. A summary o f these hypotheses is presented in Table 1.
To allow comparability with prior research, these hypotheses are tested using 
several measures of CEO compensation. These measures are (I) CEO's prior year 
cash salary, (2) CEO base salary per employment agreement, (3) CEO’s prior year 
cash bonus, (4) CEO’s prior year cash bonus as a proportion o f cash compensation 
(sum of prior year salary and cash bonus), and (5) CEO's stock option values.
Recent changes in SEC disclosure requirements allow researchers to calculate 
the value o f CEO stock options. The stock-based compensation component used in
19
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
compensation studies is the change in the value o f  the CEO’s stock options from one 
year to the next. The calculation o f the value o f CEO stock options is discussed in 
section 3.1.
2.3.1 Compensation and Investment Opportunities
This section develops testable hypotheses based upon theory and the relation 
between compensation and the IOS. Research on the relation between executive 
compensation and a  firm's investment opportunities reveals that compensation is cross- 
sectionally related to firm size, growth, prior performance, and firm risk [Smith and 
Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver (1993); Baber et al. (1996)]. The compensation 
function in these studies is modeled as:
Compensation = /  (Size, Growth, Regulation, Firm Performance, Risk).7
These studies recognize the endogeneity o f the right-hand side variables, e.g., 
future growth depends on incentives. Since these variables are internal to the firm and 
underlying exogenous factors are difficult to identify, these variables are treated as 
predetermined.
A firm’s IOS is defined as its prospective investment opportunities and 
associated payoff distributions [Smith and Watts (1992)]. A firm's IOS is driven by 
firm-specific investment in “specialized physical and human capital” [Smith and Watts
(1992)]. A firm’s IOS is multidimensional, and includes the type o f knowledge the 
firm produces, production and information externalities among a firm's investments,
7 Since firms in regulated industries are excluded from this study, regulation is not discussed.
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technological and demand uncertainty, regulation, type o f customers and employees, 
asset specificity, product and other tortious liabilities, and tax structure (domestic and 
foreign) [Christie, Joye and Watts (1998); Christie (1998)]. Christie, Joye and Watts 
(1998) argue that these IOS characteristics are related to firm size, growth, and risk.
Using industry-level data from 1965 to 1985, Smith and Watts (1992) find that 
measures o f  the IOS, i.e., availability o f growth options and firm size, are related to a 
firm’s financing, dividend, and executive compensation policies. Gaver and Gaver
(1993) and Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang (1996), using firm level data, extend Smith 
and Watts (1992) with similar results. Baber et al. (1996) examine the use and value 
o f stock options, whereas Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) only 
document the existence of stock option plans. These three ex post studies use different 
definitions o f executive compensation and different IOS measures.
Using an ex ante approach that focuses on the set o f permissible contracts 
instead o f  actual remuneration, Kole (1997) provides evidence that the terms of 
incentive stock arrangements vary systematically with the characteristics o f the assets 
being managed. The results o f the IOS studies discussed above support a relationship 
between a firm’s IOS and its corporate policies. Unfortunately, there is no consensus 
on the proper proxies to represent the IOS.
Prior evidence finds that larger firms have greater executive compensation 
[Smith and Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver (1993)]. This supports theory that larger 
firms are more complex, executives have an increased span o f  supervision and control, 
and that managerial decisions affect greater amounts o f resources. The supply o f
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executives with the talent and experience to manage these larger firms is scarce in the 
managerial labor market. Therefore, a higher equilibrium wage for executives with 
expertise in managing large firms is required to attract and retain these individuals 
[Smith and Watts (1992)]. Size is usually included in contracting studies as a control 










Salary + Larger firms more complex; therefore, higher salary.




Prior research predicts that executive compensation varies positively with 
investment opportunities, i.e., the larger the proportion o f  firm value represented by 
growth options, the greater the manager’s compensation [Gaver and Gaver (1993); 
Smith and Watts (1992)]. The results from these studies support theories regarding 
increased compensation for greater risk and the exceptional skill required by top 
management. Some studies show that firms that feature a greater frequency o f stock- 
related compensation are associated with projects having longer time horizons, since 
future cash flows are better linked to stock returns [Lambert and Larcker (1987); 
Gaver and Gaver (1993)]. These findings imply that accounting numbers may be 
limited in their ability to reflect expected cash flows, while market measures may be 
more sensitive to managerial actions that have fixture period consequences. In other 
words, timing differences between managerial actions and outcomes (subsequent cash
22
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flows) vary with the nature o f the actions, e.g., a  credit granting action that results in a  
sale has a short time horizon, whereas, revenues from investments in R&D are likely 
to take much longer.
Compensation theory also predicts that firms with more growth options 
(relatively fewer assets-in-place) use stock-based compensation more frequently 
because management's performance is more difficult to monitor [Baber et al. (1996); 
Gaver and Gaver (1993)]. Evidence supports predictions that high growth or research 
intensive firms are more likely than low growth (low R&D) firms to use equity-based 
compensation plans [Clinch (1991); Smith and Watts (1992); Gaver and Gaver 
(1993); Kole (1997); Baber et al. (1996)]. Other studies find that stock price is less 
informative than accounting earnings in high-growth firms [Clinch (1991); Bizjak et al
(1993)]. This is important for the present study since IPOs are typically high growth 
firms. Baber et al. (1996) separate firms into those with high and low investment 
opportunities and find that the values o f noncash compensation components are large 
and that their cross-sectional variation is high relative to cash compensation. Testable 








Growth Salary 0 No effect.




+ High growth firms harder to monitor, so need ex 
ante incentive to maximize value.
s Baber et al. (1996) construct an IOS measure using factor analysis on four variables. The partition 
between high and low IOS is determined by whether the EOS factor is above or below the median.
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Investors need information both for valuation purposes and to monitor agents 
[Paul (1992)]. Accounting information, a  commonly used basis for the measure o f  
firm performance, serves both decision-making and stewardship roles (performance 
evaluation and compensation) [Gjesdal (1981)]. Performance evaluation should be 
based on firm specific events that are under the manager's control and that reflect the 
value added by the manager [Paul (1992)]. Because accounting earnings numbers 
predominantly reflect firm-specific events, they are used most often in executive 
compensation contracts [Sloan (1993)]. Thus, firm performance is an economic 
determinant o f  CEO compensation [Murphy (1985)]. Compensation is usually 
contingent on more than one performance measure, and research predicts that the 
relative importance o f alternative measures should be a function o f  their precision and 
sensitivity to the manager’s performance [Banker and Datar (1989)]. A signal that is 
more sensitive to changes in the manager’s effort should receive greater weight. 
Therefore, the informational properties o f  alternative measures must be determined 
based on the environment and characteristics o f  each firm. As the signal gets noisier, 
alternative measures are substituted. Ely (1991) shows that using several accounting 
metrics to capture financial performance better explains compensation across diverse 
industries. This suggests that the value o f accounting numbers used in executive 
compensation contracts differs depending upon the firm's circumstances.
Additionally, the financial performance measures used in compensation 
contracts have different incentive effects depending on whether they focus on the long
24
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or short-term performance o f  the firm. Accounting measures are often positively 
related to annual bonus rewards, whereas stock measures are related to long-term 
incentive awards whose value depends on the number o f stock option grants, exercise 
price, vesting, and stock price. Baber et al. (1996) find that the relation between 
compensation and accounting return is positive and significant only for cash bonuses. 
The performance incentive should motivate the manager to increase the value o f  the 
firm. When accounting numbers do not readily reflect changes in firm value, the 
primary performance measure will be stock-based even though this is a  noisy measure 
o f managerial performance. Stock-based measures o f performance are subject to 
market-wide shocks that affect firm value, but are beyond the manager's control.9 
Accounting-based performance measures are used when they provide better measures 
o f value added by the manager. Accounting-based performance measures include 
earnings per share, return on assets, return on equity, and pre-tax profits. Stock-based 
performance measures include total stockholder returns and stock performance relative 
to a firm's industry peer group [Bushman et al. (1996)]. The following predictions are 
made regarding compensation and firm performance:
9 Recontracting can reduce the downside risk o f  these market-wide shocks. This was the approach taken 
by many firms after the 1987 stock market crash. Many firms lowered the exercise prices o f stock 
options to keep their incentive/reward mechanism meaningful [Wall Street Journal (1988)]. 
Recontracting is also commonly done when the price decline is firm specific [Byrne, Business Week, 
Oct. 12, 1998].
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Salary 0 Fixed component of compensation.
Bonus 0/+ Firm-specific, incentive and pay for performance 
measure for the largest firms, zero otherwise.
Stock
Options
+ Options more valuable when firm has done well in 
past (reflected in both stock value and ROA).
Firm risk is also relevant in modeling CEO compensation and is expected to 
have a positive relation with compensation. Managers are risk averse and are to be 
compensated more for bearing greater risk [Antle and Smith (1985); Smith and Watts 
(1992)]. Results from prior research are mixed. Smith and Watts (1992), after 
controlling for growth and size, find that risk is not significant in their compensation 
regressions. This finding is inconsistent with theory and intuition. Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker (1999) observe a negative relationship between risk and CEO 
compensation. On the other hand, risk is significantly positive with respect to 
executive compensation in Cyert, et al. (1997), while controlling for growth 
opportunities and firm size. These conflicting results may be partially associated with












Salary + Higher compensation for bearing greater risk.
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2.3.2 Compensation and CEO Characteristics
This section develops hypotheses on the relation between CEO compensation 
and CEO characteristics and equ ity  ownership. These predictions can be based on two 
theoretically different viewpoints. One perspective is that the predictions reflect 
efficient contracting, whereas the other perspective is that managers engage in 
opportunism. These efficiency and opportunism explanations are not mutually 
exclusive, though. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) argue that expected opportunism 
exists and is efficient. Rational shareholders anticipate expected opportunism and 
either contract it away or price-protect themselves. Therefore, the manager bears the 
agency costs. This gives the manager an incentive to minimize expected opportunism. 
So the use o f  the term opportunism means the unexpected component. For a sample o f 
IPOs that have new contracts, opportunism is expected to be small.
A firm's ownership and governance structure also influences CEO 
compensation. The Board o f  Directors has decision-making authority and a 
monitoring role. According to Jensen (1993), the CEO and Chairman o f  the Board 
should be different individuals in order for the firm to have an effective and 
independent board. Empirical evidence shows that CEO compensation for non-IPO 
firms is higher when the CEO is also the Chairman o f  the Board [Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker (1999); Cyert et al. (1997); Brickley et al. (1997)]. This evidence leads to 
the following testable hypotheses for IPOs:
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Salary -t- Greater responsibility, higher pay.




The CEO's equity ownership is related to the power o f  the CEO and affects the 
degree o f monitoring required [Jensen and Murphy (1990); Mehran (1995)]. CEO 
salary and bonus compensation has been found to be increasing in his or her equity 
ownership, but decreasing when the CEO is the largest shareholder [Cyert et al. 
(1997)]. The relation between CEO compensation and equity ownership is 
ambiguous, though. An opportunistic explanation is that if  the CEO has considerable 
equity ownership, then his or her power may be formidable and thus allow extraction 
o f greater compensation. On the other hand, the more equity ownership the CEO has, 
the stronger the link between CEO wealth and stock performance. This also subjects 
the CEO to increased amounts o f firm-specific risk. Therefore, the CEO is expected to 
receive less incentive-based compensation that is tied to stock price [Sloan (1993)]. 
This implies greater base salary and eamings-based incentives. Since it is difficult to 
predict the weighting o f  salary versus bonus in this situation, it becomes an empirical 
issue. The efficiency story is that if  the CEO is under-diversified, then he or she will 
require a risk premium in the form o f  increased base salary. Also, a risk premium
28
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exceeding his or her reservation wage is required to attract and retain the CEO.











Salary + Fixed component as risk premium.
Bonus 0 No effect.
Stock
Options
- Substitution effect—the more stock owned by CEO, 
the less options are needed for incentives.
The equity ownership o f directors and officers is likely to affect the degree o f 
monitoring firms require [Jensen (1993); Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)]. 
Increased ownership by the board provides an incentive to monitor and collect the 
necessary information. Also, board ownership can be influential in control contests 
with the CEO. This is supported by the negative association between ownership o f 
officers and directors and CEO compensation for non-IPO firms [Core, Holthausen,













Salary 0 No effect.
Bonus 0 No effect.
Stock
Options
- Increased incentive to directly monitor, so 
substitution effect.
CEO tenure is included in some compensation models, but results are mixed. 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that CEO tenure does not explain any o f the 
cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, but Cyert et al. (1997) find that tenure
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is significantly positive for salary and bonuses, but insignificant when equity-based 
components are included in compensation. From an efficient contracting perspective, 
a positive relation between tenure and cash compensation may reflect rewards for 
staying with the firm. First, the firm retains the specialized knowledge o f the CEO and 
knowledge increases over time. Second, golden handcuff clauses reinforce value 
maximization by encouraging a longer horizon with the firm.10 The opportunistic 
explanation is that compensation is higher due to the CEO's increased influence with 









with the firm 
(TENURE)
Salary + Incentive to acquire firm-specific human capital. 
Thus, increased knowledge and experience, so 
higher pay.




Whether the CEO is also a founder may have some explanatory power in the 
level and components o f compensation [Kole (1997)]. Owner-managers may be 
accustomed to perquisite consumption and may not be inclined to decrease these 
benefits. It is expected that these former owner/managers will change their behavior 
regarding perks when the offering brings in outside owners. One way in which these 
prior owner-managers can maintain their utility maximizing behavior is to increase 
their base salary as a substitute for previously consumed perks. The form and amount
10 Golden handcuffs are deferred compensation packages that executives forfeit if they leave the firm 
prior to vesting [Megginson (1997)].
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o f compensation should depend on the subsequent management role o f  the owner, the 
percentage o f  retained ownership held by the owner, and his or her risk aversion. 
Since it is difficult to predict the effect that a  founder CEO has on compensation, it is 











Salary ? Control variable.




2 3 .3  Compensation and IPO Classifications
This section develops hypotheses regarding the relation between CEO 
compensation and IPO firm characteristics based on agency theory, relations regarding 
investment opportunities and growth, and certain corporate governance characteristics. 
Most o f an IPO’s value is represented by the value o f  options on future investment 
opportunities [Rao (1989)]. Thus, different risk factors, assets in place, length o f 
operating history, future growth plans and prospects, and relative levels o f R&D 
expenditures will affect the component weightings and complexities o f compensation 
contracts used for individual firms.
There are few studies on compensation contracts in IPOs. Beatty and Zajac
(1994) analyze managerial incentives, risk sharing, and monitoring in 435 firms that 
went public in 1984. Their study focuses on variables representing noncash executive 
compensation, managerial ownership, and board structure. They measure noncash
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executive compensation as the percentage o f  total compensation derived from stock 
options plus the change in value o f  the stock held by the executive in the pre-IPO year. 
Independent variables in this noncash compensation regression include two size 
measures (sales and market value o f  equity), firm age, manager’s age and risk. 
However, their results suffer from collinearity and model misspecification (omitted 
variables).
Mature firms are larger, older and less risky than start-ups. If  executives o f these 
firms have retained considerable ownership in the company, then long-term incentives 
to maximize value exist. Compensation contracts in these types o f firms will include a 
bonus component based on accounting performance to cover short-term incentives. 
Although this is a newly public firm, it is likely that, when compared with other types 
o f EPOs, this firm is in a relatively later stage o f investment. That is, they are likely to 
be exercising growth options rather than creating them. These types o f  firms are 
expected to have higher levels o f  assets-in-place and longer operating histories that 
improve accounting numbers as a  signal for determining the value added by the CEO.
The agency problems discussed earlier regarding roll-ups arise from separation 
o f ownership and management and the complexity o f  combining several businesses. 
The monitoring and incentive alignment is more complex, and contracts depend on 
whether an outside manager is hired as CEO or whether one of the prior owners takes 
a controlling role. Long-term incentives for an outside manager may be addressed by 
compensation contracts with considerable stock-based components. This aligns the 
CEO's interest with those o f  the shareholders. It is expected that the prevalence of
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stock-based versus accounting-based components will vary depending upon the 
governance structure adopted and the equity ownership o f  the CEO.
If a firm is a roll-up, a positive relation with CEO salary is expected. This 
prediction is related to the complexity o f  combining and operating a diverse set o f  
firms and lines o f  business. Their internal organizations are more complex, relative to 
other IPOs. There is no reason to expect that incentive compensation, whether bonus 
or stock options, is any different from other mature firms. Expectations regarding roll­










Salary + Complexity; multi-dimensional firms merging.




Section 2.1.1 discusses the reasons why accounting earnings for start-ups are 
low or negative initially. Tying managerial incentives to accounting earnings for start­
ups could be counterproductive. Basing compensation on accounting earnings could 
provide an incentive for managers to cut R&D, advertising, or other discretionary 
expenditures to increase accounting earnings, rather than increase firm value. For 
start-ups that are investing in R&D, the future benefits o f  this investment are not likely 
to be reflected in accounting earnings for a considerable period o f  time. In an efficient 
market, stock prices reflect the perceived future impact o f  R&D immediately (based on 
publicly available information). Thus, the primary measure used in these firms will be
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stock-based even though this is a  noisy measure o f  managerial performance because it 
includes market-wide shocks that effect firm value. Therefore, incentive 
compensation for start-ups should be more heavily weighted towards stock-based 
components than proportions found in mature firms.
As stated earlier, firms that are going public are growth oriented and o f  high risk. 
Efficient incentive arrangements compensate executives for greater risks [Antle and 
Smith (1985)]. Gaver and Gaver (1993) find that executives in higher-risk firms do 
have higher base salaries. It is difficult to disentangle this risk story from the 
assumption that it is harder to manage growth companies than it is to manage assets in 
place. This implies that managers with expertise in managing growth are relatively 
scarce in the managerial labor market and therefore have a higher reservation wage. If 
IPOs are categorized into relative riskiness or relative growth opportunities, i.e., start­
ups versus non start-ups, and if  it is more difficult to manage high growth firms, then 
based on prior research using large firm samples, it is expected that CEO base salaries 
in higher-risk (high growth) firms will be significantly greater than for lower-risk (low 
growth) firms. On the other hand, start-up firms have limited operating history and are 
incurring high start-up costs. Lower cash flows are expected during this time which 
may affect the amount o f salary paid to CEOs. After controlling for size and growth, 
though, there is no expectation that start-ups have different salary levels from mature 
firms. The following predictions are made for start-up firms:
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Salary 0 No effect.
Bonus - Accounting numbers not a useful performance 
measure, so stock options are substituted.
Stock
Options
-t- Accounting numbers not a useful performance 
measure, so stock options are substituted.
A summary o f the hypotheses discussed in section 2.3 are presented in Table 1.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.











Salary + + Larger firms more complex; therefore, 
higher salary.




0 0 No effect.
Growth Salary 0 0 No effect.
Bonus 0 0 Accounting-based performance less 
useful for high growth firms.
Stock
Options
+ + High growth firms harder to monitor, so 





Salary 0 0 Fixed component of compensation.
Bonus 0/+ 0/+ Firm-specific, incentive and pay for 




+ 0/+ Options more valuable when firm has 






Salary + +■ Higher compensation for bearing greater 
risk.
Bonus 0 0 No effect.
Stock
Options





Salary + 0 Greater responsibility, higher pay.
Bonus + + Greater responsibility, higher pay.
Stock
Options




Salary + -t- Fixed component as risk premium.
Bonus 0 0 No effect.
Stock
Options
0 Substitution effect—the more stock 
owned by CEO, the less options are 
needed for incentives.
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Salary 0 0 No effect.
Bonus 0 + No effect.
Stock
Options




Salary + + Incentive to acquire firm-specific human 
capital, thus, increased knowledge and 
experience, so higher pay.
Bonus 0 0 No effect.
Stock
Options




Salary ? - Control variable.
Bonus ? 0 Control variable.
Stock
Options
? 0 Control variable.
Roll-up
(DR)
Salary + 0 Complexity, multi-dimensional firms 
merging.
Bonus 0 - No effect.
Stock
Options
0 0 No effect.
Start-up
(DS)
Salary 0 0 No effect.
Bonus Accounting numbers not a useful 




+ + Accounting numbers not a useful 
performance measure, so stock options are 
substituted.
a Sign founc is for the ful model without interaction terms. For salary, this is column 4 of
Table 13; for bonus, column 6 of Table 15; and for stock option values, column 4 of 
Table 18.
Pred. sign = “0” indicates that the estimate is not expected to be statistically different from 
zero.
Pred. sign = “?” indicates that no prediction is made about the direction of the effect.
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AND VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS
Since May 6, 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires 
mandatory electronic filing for registration statements, proxy statements, and other 
SEC filings. Based on data collected from Hoover’s IPO Central and EDGAR Online, 
over 1,400 companies filed offering prospectuses between May 6, 1996 and February 
5, 1998. O f those that filed, 841 were documented as trading for the first time by 
February 5, 1998. This study is based on a random sample o f  207 firms from the 
population o f 841 trading firms. Table 2 presents sample selection procedures.
Offerings in regulated industries (banks, insurance companies) and Real Estate 
Investment Trusts are excluded [Gaver and Gaver (1993); Baber et al. (1996); 
Mikkelson et al. (1997)]. Other exclusions are: (1) firms that did not start trading or 
data was unavailable, (2) offerings that include multiple classes o f common stock with 
different voting rights; (3) unit offerings that include warrants; and (4) subsidiaries or 
spin-offs o f public companies. Table 2 presents the frequency o f  each o f these 
exclusions. The final sample results in 111 firms.
Ninety-eight sample firms are listed on NASDAQ, and fourteen are listed on 
either NYSE or AMEX. Table 3 presents the sample distribution by one-digit SIC 
code. Forty-one percent o f  the sample firms are in service industries. The distribution 
o f the sample by IPO type is presented in o f Table 4. The IPO classification results in 
36 start-ups and 75 mature firms o f  which 18 are roll-ups.
Descriptive information not presented in tables indicates that 37 firms (33.3%) 
have sales of stock by shareholders that acquired their shares prior to the IPO. In
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Table 2: Sample Selection Procedures
Selection criteria No. of firms
Random sample (population=841 firms) 
Firms eliminated:
207
Not trading or data unavailable (13)
Banks, [nsurance, REIT (23)
Multiple classes of common stock with different voting rights (17)
Offering is in units and warrants (25)
Majority-owned by public company or spin-off £18)
Final sample i l l
Table 3: Sample distribution by one-digit SIC code
SIC Code Industry Frequency Percentage
1 Primary 7 6.3
2 Manufacturing (nondurables) 8 7.2
3 Manufacturing (durables) 24 21.6
4 Transportation 8 7.2
5 Wholesalers and retailers 19 17.1
6 Financial services 1 0.9
7 Business services 23 20.8
8 Consumer services 21 18.9
Total i l l 11M
Table 4: Sample distribution by IPO type




Total H I 100.0
Start-ups are firms with less than five years of operating history. Mature firms have five 
or more years of operating history. Roll-ups are mature firms, i.e., at least one individual 
firm in the roll-up has five or more years of operating history.
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57.7% o f  firms, the same person holds the CEO and Chairman o f  the Board positions. 
Almost half o f the CEOs are founders. Only 27.8% o f the roll-up CEOs are founders, 
which supports the assertion that these types o f IPOs are complex and contract with an 
outsider to manage the combination o f several firms.
CEO employment agreement dates are disclosed for 59 firms and indicate they 
are current (the oldest employment agreement is dated 1994). All o f the sample firms 
have stock option plans either in place or to be effective with the offering. CEOs in 
10.8% o f the firms exercised options during the last full fiscal year prior to the 
offering. At the date o f the offering, 40.5% of CEOs had vested, in-the-money 
options. None o f the sample firms have granted restricted stock, phantom stock, 
performance shares, or performance units, and only nine firms have a long-term 
performance plan in place. This is consistent with stock ownership being a substitute 
mechanism for long term performance plans. Nearly all firms state their intention not 
to pay dividends in the foreseeable future.
Table 5 presents sample descriptive statistics. The median total stock ownership 
dilution represented by the offering is 30.03%. The median stake o f CEO equity 
ownership is 15.1% prior to the offering and declines to 10.2% immediately after the 
offering.11 The median equity ownership stake for officers and directors as a group 
(excluding the CEO) decreases from 36.15% to 26.2%.12 These statistics indicate that
11 The median ownership in Core etal. (1998) for 205 large firms is 0.10 percent.
12 The median ownership in Cyert et al. (1997) for 1,671 large and small firms is 4.88%.
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managerial ownership is substantial, which implies that incentives for board members 
to monitor are in place for these firms.
Comparing the various size statistics in Table 5 with descriptive statistics from 
samples used in other compensation studies indicate that the IPO firms in this study 
are substantially smaller. For example, mean (median) sales in this study are 
$72,331,553 ($25,545,000). The high-IOS firms in Baber et al. (1996) are several 
times larger, with mean (median) sales o f  $1,001,000,000 ($191,000,000).
The earlier assertion that many o f  these IPOs have low or negative earnings is 
supported by the mean (median) net income o f -$377,479 (+$801,000). This also 
results in mean ROA being negative. The statistic, property, plant, and equipment as a  
percentage o f total assets, gives information about the assets in place. The mean 
(median) is 24.76% (16.56%), but the range broad (< 1% to almost 97%). This 
average, combined with descriptive information on growth, indicates that the firms in 
this study are not fixed asset intensive. The minimum growth proxy is greater than 1, 
confirming that assets-in-place are low.
3.1 Variable Definitions
This section discusses the dependent and independent variables used to test the 
hypotheses developed in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3. The variables fall into three categories: 
(1) compensation measures, (2) IOS measures: size, growth proxies, firm
performance, and risk proxies, and (3) CEO characteristics and ownership. Some o f 
the variables are based on prior research, whereas others are unique to this study.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics on Selected Variables
Variable Nk Minimum Mean Median Maximum Std Dev
Ownership
Offering as a % of Shares Outstanding * 111 5.38% 32,13% 30.03% 73.27% 13.02
Shs, Offered by Owners as a % of Tot. Shs, Offered 111 0 7.38% 0 51.28% 12.67
CEO Equity Ownership Percentage (alter IPO) 111 0.5% 18.52% 10.20% 76.40% 19.71
Change in CEO Equity Ownership Percentage 111 -42.97% -8.46% -4.90% 23.00% 10.54
Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % (alter IPO)d 111 0.00% 27.75% 26.20% 74.30% 18.12
Change in Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % i no -56.80% -12.08% -9.95% 42.00% 12.13
Proceeds
Estimated Proceeds from Offering * 111 $3,868,000 $33,058,888 $25,135,000 $194,900,000 27,446,502
Net Proceeds / BV of Assets Prior to IPO 111 0.16 1.97 1.06 37.76 3.77
Size
Sales 111 0 $72,331,533 $25,545,000 $942,800,000 130,415,098
Book Value of Assets 111 $372,920 $58,740,858 $23,491,000 $1,181,800,000 131,621,262
MV of Equity at Close of 1st Day of Trading * 111 $15,505,000 $198,890,851 $113,930,000 $3,441,271,025 372,800,615
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 111 $4,400 $20,568,291 $4,139,000 $289,431,000 51,467,681
Working Capital 111 -$17,895,000 $8,692,440 $3,887,000 $121,353,945 18,398,786
BV of Debt (excluding redeemable stock) 111 $182,348 $53,453,475 $13,745,234 $1,395,200,000 152,213,899
Number of Employees HI 4 1,349 322 28,000 3,774
Shares Offered * 111 1,100,000 3,241,008 2,700,000 13,622,500 1,760,764
Compensation
CEO Salary (prior FY) 95 $20,000 $210,280 $182,333 $600,000 108,091
CEO Bonus (prior FY) 95 0 $118,221 $36,000 $1,816,439 258,984
CEO Stock Option Value (at IPO price) 65 0 $4,937,605 $1,668,308 $65,629,992 12,042,593
CEO Salary per Employment Agreement 80 $80,000 $252,967 $205,500 $1,375,000 171,831


















Variable Nb Minimum Mean Median Maximum Std Dev
Past Performance
Net Income 111 -$72,409,000 -$377,479 $801,000 $83,000,000 13,684,902
ROA (Nl / BV Assets Prior to IPO) 111 -1.93 -0.15 0.02 0.40 0.48
Growth
Growth Proxyc 111 1.57 10.70 5.66 132.18 15.50
Other Characteristics
Volatility of Post-IPO Stock Returns0 111 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.45 0.08
Number of Risk Factors in Prospectus 111 11 19.89 20 30 3.55
CEO Tenure in Years 111 0 6.59 5 28 6.50
Property, Plant & Equip as a % of Total Assets 111 0.63% 24.76% 16.56% 96.65% 22.55
* Assumes no exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment option and includes shares offered through private placements concurrent with IPO,
b Variables with N < 111 are due to missing values, Most of these missing values result from non-disclosure of executive employment agreements and no
salary history for new CEOs. Zero minimum values are either due to the inapplicability of variables for certain firms or the true value is zero, for 
example, several firms did not pay out a bonus,
0 Defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets; book value of debt includes redeemable stock. Excluding redeemable
stock does not significantly change the value of the measure. 
d Excludes CEO ownership.
* Ranges from 9 to 30 months of stock returns for individual firms.
Variables associated with firms’ financial statements come from data in the last fiscal 
year’s disclosures presented in the offering prospectus.
3.1.1 Compensation Variables
Most executive compensation studies use ex post cash compensation (salary plus 
bonus) o f the CEO as the proxy for management compensation [Lambert and Larcker 
(1987), Clinch (1991), Sloan (1993), Gaver and Gaver (1993)].13 This is partly due to 
the difficulty in obtaining data about the specifics of compensation contracts. The use 
o f this proxy ignores compensation under stock incentive plans, so compensation is 
measured with error. However, the availability of data on compensation components 
has been enhanced by the SEC’s expanded disclosure requirement that was effective in 
1992. Public companies now report five components o f CEO compensation: salary, 
cash bonus, long-term incentive payout, and the value o f  stock options and restricted 
stock granted during the year. These details allow more precise measures o f CEO 
compensation than have been used in prior research.
Compensation variables in this study include CEO’s prior year cash salary, salary 
per employment agreement, prior year cash bonus, and the value o f stock options. The 
cash components, i.e., salary and bonus, come from the financial statements for the last 
fiscal year prior to the IPO.
Compensation studies generally measure stock-based compensation as the value 
o f  current year option grants plus the change in the value o f  prior years’ options
13 These compensation variables may be levels of or changes in compensation.
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granted. For a  study o f  IPOs, there isn’t a  market price prior to the IPO, so the 
measure o f stock option value includes both the current grants and the full value o f 
prior years’ grants. Therefore, the value o f stock options includes exercisable and 
unexercisable options held by the CEO. The formula for valuing the exercisable 
options is max. [0, (IPO price - exercise price)] times the number o f shares. The 
unexercisable options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model 
modified for early exercise.14 An examination o f  the prospectuses indicates that the 
vesting schedule for most o f  the stock option grants is about four years. Therefore, the 
term to expiration used in the valuation model is 4 years, the risk-free rate is 6%, and 
the volatility is an annualized number that is based on 9 to 30 months o f post-IPO 
stock returns. None o f  the firms in the sample granted restricted stock and all 
compensation information comes from the last amended offering prospectus filed with 
the SEC.
3.1.2 IOS Variables
Firm size has been cited as a function o f  the firm’s investment opportunity set 
and has been used as a surrogate for numerous measures (complexity, risk, political 
costs, etc.) in the finance and accounting literatures. The proxy for firm size used in 
this study and in most compensation studies is sales revenue. Sensitivity tests are run 
on two alternate proxies, log o f  sales and book value o f assets.
14 Hemmer et al. (1994) state that substituting the expected term for the actual contract time to maturity 
still overstates the value o f the options. They suggest an alternative approach to valuing employees’ 
stock options which takes into account the probability o f  early exercise. Their algorithm is not used in 
this study.
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The proxy for growth options is the ratio of the market value o f the firm (market 
value of equity -I- book value o f  debt) to the book value o f assets.15 Alternate growth 
measures used in sensitivity tests include: (1) the ratio o f net offering proceeds to the 
book value o f assets prior to the IPO and (2) the ratio o f market value o f equity + book 
value o f long-term debt to book value o f assets [Biqak et al. (1993)]. Market value of 
equity is determined by using the closing price on the first trading day multiplied by 
the number o f common shares outstanding.
Compensation models also use an earnings proxy.16 The number used in the 
numerator o f this measure varies across studies. Healy (1985) finds that, in large 
firms, 52.7 percent o f  the company-year observations use earnings before taxes and 
33.5 percent use earnings before interest as contract definitions of earnings. Both 
numbers are determined before the deduction for bonus expense. The determination of 
an appropriate accounting return measure for this study is difficult since only a small 
number o f firms disclose in the prospectus the definition used in their compensation 
contracts (see Table 12). Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of net income 
to the book value o f assets is the firm performance measure used in this study.
Risk proxies used in this study are (1) stock return volatility, (2) the number of 
risk factors disclosed in the prospectus, and (3) the number o f uses o f proceeds 
disclosed in the prospectus. Stock return volatility, an ex post risk measure, is based on
15 "This measure is the inverse o f the primary IOS proxy used in Smith and Watts (1992).
16 The accounting return measure used in Smith and Watts (1992) is (operating income + interest 
expense)/firm value,.
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firm-specific monthly stock: returns. The number o f  available observations ranges 
from 9 to 30 months, with a  median o f 21 months.
To test the reasonableness o f  the number o f  risk factors measure, an out-of- 
sample regression is run using Ritter’s (1991) IPO database. The standard deviation o f  
monthly stock returns for three years subsequent to the IPO for firms from Ritter 
(1991) is regressed on the number o f  risk factors listed in the prospectuses. Results 
presented in Table 11 indicate that for both the Ritter sample and the sample used in 
this study, the number o f risk factors is a  useful predictor o f  ex post risk, stock return 
volatility.
Another proxy for ex ante risk is also tested. This proxy is the number o f uses o f  
proceeds listed in the prospectus [Beatty and Ritter (1986)]. Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
use this measure because the SEC requires riskier issuers to provide more detail on the 
uses o f proceeds.
3.1.3 CEO Characteristic Variables
Many compensation and IPO studies also include CEO characteristics and 
corporate governance variables in their analyses. In addition to managerial ownership 
percentages before and after the offering (CEO and officers and directors), other 
variables collected are whether the CEO and Chairman o f the Board positions are held 
by the same person, CEO tenure, and whether the CEO is a  founder of the firm.
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4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
This section presents empirical tests o f hypotheses discussed in Section 2. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional regressions are used in all tests. First, 
analyses o f  differences in sample structure, i.e., differences between IPO types, are 
presented. Second, the use o f  proceeds disclosed in prospectuses, the risk proxies, and 
IPO type dummies are examined to determine if  these variables explain variation in 
the growth proxy, (market value o f  equity plus book value o f debt) f  book value of 
assets. Third, CEO compensation variables are regressed on determinants of 
compensation that theory supported by evidence finds to be relevant in explaining 
compensation variation.
4.1 Sample Structure
Classification o f sample firms by IPO type results in 36 start-ups and 75 mature 
firms, of which 18 are roll-ups. A simple way to report several differences in means is 
to regress continuous variables on dummy variables representing the IPO types. Thus, 
the coefficients on the dummies capture the differences in means. Differences in 
means for start-ups and mature firms are presented in Table 6. Table 7 separates roll­
ups from other mature firms and presents differences in means for the three 
classifications. The following results are reported for predicted differences between 
start-ups and mature firms (section 2.1.1).
The data support the prediction that start-ups are smaller than mature firms. 
Variables with significantly negative differences include sales, book value o f assets, 
book value o f  debt, the size of the offering, and the number o f employees. Size
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measures that are not significantly different for the two IPO types are market value o f  
equity, property, plant, and equipment, and working capital. The differences in means 
for the two accounting-related firm performance variables, net income and return on 
assets (ROA), are significantly negative for start-ups, supporting the assertion that 
these firms are in developmental stages, possibly invest heavily in R&D and/or 
marketing, and have high initial operating costs. As predicted, the difference in means 
for the growth proxy for start-up firms is significantly positive, confirming that these 
firms are either at the extreme end o f  the growth continuum or market to book 
mismeasures growth. The difference in means for both stock return volatility and the 
number o f risk factors is positive and significant for start-ups, confirming the 
prediction that these firms are riskier, i.e., exhibit more ex ante and ex post risk than 
non start-ups. Significantly negative differences include proceeds from the offering 
and CEO tenure. These two findings are associated with start-ups being smaller and 
younger firms.
The results from the analysis o f  differences between the three IPO types in Table 
7 offer information on characteristics o f  roll-ups. The significantly positive difference 
in means on book value o f assets and size o f the offering provide evidence that roll­
ups are significantly larger in size and have more assets in place than other mature 
firms. They also have the lowest proportion o f growth opportunities among the three 
types.
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Table 6: Differences in Means for Start-ups and Mature Firms
Variable








Offering as a % o f Shares Outstanding * 3 4 3 1 ** -6.73 **
Shs. Offered by Owners as a % o f Tot. Shs. Offered 9.43 ** - -632 **
CEO Equity Ownership (after IPO) 19.19 ** -2.06
Change in CEO Equity Ownership Percentage -9 3 I ** 2.62
Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % (after IPO)e 26.52 ** 3.81
Change in Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % e -12.82 ** 234
Proceeds
Estimated Proceeds from Offering * 35,969,708 ** - -8,975,027 *
Net Proceeds /  BV o f Assets Prior to IPO 1.27 ** + 2.16 **
Size
Sales 99,720,446 ** - -84,449,149 **
Book Value o f Assets 74,047,498 ** - -47,195,471 **
MY of Equity at Close o f 1st Day of Trading 4 176,962,067 ** - 67,613,752
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 24,899,799 ** - -13,355,481
Working Capital 9,763,000 ** - -3,300,891
Book Value o f Debt (excluding redeemable stock) 70,870,364 »* - -53,702,074 **
Number of Employees 1,856 ** - -1,564 **
Shares Offered4 3,449,577 ** - -643,090 ”
Compensation
CEO Salary (prior FY) 234,583 ** -72,151 **
CEO Bonus (prior FY) 160,553 ** -125,671 **
CEO Stock Option Value (at IPO price) 5,768,055 ** -2,346,923
CEO Salary per Employment Agreement 280,414 ** -84,453 **
Salary Agreement as a % of Prior Year Salary 115.11 ** 45.72 **
Past Performance
Net Income 1,859,984 - -6,898,845 **
ROA (NI /  BV Assets Prior to IPO) -0.01 - -0.43 **
Growth
Growth Proxy b 6.98 ** + 11.46 **
Other Characteristics
Volatility o f Post-IPO Stock Returns£ 0.21 ** + 0.03 **
Number of Risk Factors in Prospectus 19.19 ** + 2.17 **
CEO Tenure in Years 8.15 ** - -4.81 **
Property, Plant & Equip as a % of Total Assets 27.03 ** - -7.01 *
a Assumes no exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment option and includes shares 
offered through private placements concurrent with IPO. 
b Defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets; book 
value of debt includes redeemable stock. 
c Regressions assume constant variance across subsamples.
d Mature firms = Roll-ups + Other Mature Firms.
e Excludes CEO ownership.
f Ranges from 9 to 30 months of stock returns for individual firms.
* P-value<0.10;
** P-value < 0.05.
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Table 7: Differences in Means for the Three IPO Types
Variable
Variable i= P0 + Bi Roll-up + )2 Start-up + e c
Intercept 













Offering as a % of Shares Outstanding" 32.44 *• 7.78 ♦♦ -4,86 ♦ 0,003
Shs, Offered by Owners as a % o f Tot. Shs, Offered 10,50 *♦ -4.47 - -7,39 *♦ 0,020
CEO Equity Ownership (after IPO) 21.09 ♦♦ -7.94 -3.97 0.291
Change in CEO Equity Ownership Percentage -9,27 ♦♦ -0.14 2.59 0,475
Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership %  (after IPO )d 25.80 •* 2.99 4.53 0.489
Change in Officers' & Dirs' Equity Ownership % d -11.53 ♦* -5,58 ♦ 0,96 0,166
Proceeds
Estimated Proceeds from Offering' 34,254,817 ♦* 7.145,377 - -7,260,137 0.172
Net Proceeds / BV of Assets Prior to IPO 1,43 ♦♦ -0,66 + 2,00 ♦* 0.014
Size
Sales 96,966,094 *♦ 11,476,465 -81,694,798 0,005
Book Value of Assets 69,370,027 ♦* 19,489,459 ♦♦ -42,518,001 * 0.181
MV of Equity at Close of 1st Day o f Trading * 187,236,375 ♦♦ -42,809,619 57,339,444 0.617
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 23,315,680 6,600,495 -11,771,362 0,398
Working Capital 7,998,503 *♦ 7,352,068 -1,536,395 0.228
Book Value o f Debt (excluding redeemable stock) 68,937,825 ♦* 8,052.245 -51,769,535 ♦ 0,217
Number o f Employees 1,638 ♦♦ 909 -1,346 ♦♦ 0,082
Shares Offered * 3,315,272 *♦ 559,606 -508,784 ♦ 0,098
Compensation
CEO Salary (prior FY) 234,209 ** 2,492 -71,777 ** 0,008
CEO Bonus (prior FY) 164,788 ♦* -33,349 -129,906 ♦♦ 0,076
CEO Stock Option Value (at IPO price) 6,917,183 ♦♦ -6,032,921 -3,496,051
CEO Salary per Employment Agreement 312,036 *♦ -106,723 ♦♦ -116.074 ** 0,012
































Net Income 2,464.280 -2.517,900 - -7,503,141 ♦♦ 0,035
ROA (Nl /  BV Assets Prior to IPO) -0,003 -0,03 - -0.44 *♦ 0,000
Growth
Growth Proxyb 8,07 ♦♦ -4.52 + 10,38 ♦* 0.000
Other Characteristics
Volatility of Post-IPO Stock Returns • 0.22 ♦♦ -0,02 + 0,02 0,195
Number o f Risk Factors in Prospectus 19,44 ♦* -1,05 + 1,92 ♦♦ 0,005
CEO Tenure in Years 9,44 ♦♦ - -5.38 ♦♦ - -6.11 ♦* 0,000
Property, Plant & Equip as a %  o f Total Assets 24,81 ♦♦ 9,23 - -4,80 0,097
* Assumes no exercise of the underwriters' over-allotment option and includes shares offered through private placements concurrent with IPO,
b Defined as (market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets; book value of debt includes redeemable stock,
0 Regressions assume constant variance across subsamples,
d Excludes CEO ownership.
c Ranges from 9 to 30 months of stock returns for individual firms,
♦ P-value<0,l0
** P-value < 0.05,
4.2 Growth, Use o f Proceeds, and Risk
Table 8 presents the uses o f proceeds by IPO type. The number o f uses 
disclosed by individual firms ranges from one to seven. Six firms listed only one use 
and eight listed as many as seven uses. Over 85% o f  firms list working capital and 
general corporate purposes as a  planned use o f proceeds. Half o f the start-up firms are 
using the proceeds for R&D, whereas just 16% o f mature firms cite this use. None o f 
the roll-ups disclose any R&D use. This lack o f  R&D for roll-ups may be associated 
with their IOS, plans for merging separate firms, and industry membership.
In contrast, 100% o f roll-ups are retiring debt. Only 74% and 42% of other 
mature firms and start-ups, respectively, plan to retire debt. The finding that all roll­
ups are retiring debt offers insight into their organizational structure and debt 
contracting. If the debt is at the "founding company" level, there may be constraints 
on the organizational design o f the resulting firm (post-IPO). That is, they may not be 
able to reconfigure into new profit and cost centers without paying off the debt. This 
is related to potential conflicts among debt covenants that may place constraints on 
investment opportunities. Another reason to pay off debt is to avoid wealth transfers 
to debtholders, who may have claims against larger pools o f  assets after the IPO.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the uses of proceeds are categorized as follows: (I) 
creating growth options, (2) exercising growth options, (3) retiring debt, and (4) other 
uses. A growth proxy, market to book is regressed on the usage categories, risk 
proxies, and dummy variables representing IPO types (start-ups and roll-ups). Results
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presented in Tables 9 and 10 indicate that these groupings have some predictive ability 
for growth.
The exercising growth options (XGO) category in Table 9 is significantly 
positive in all regressions (p-values range from 0.016 to 0.041), supporting the 
prediction. Firms that are creating growth options (CGO) are also significant except 
when IPO type dummies are included. The start-up dummy is evidently picking up the 
differences in R&D uses. As expected, retiring debt is not significant in explaining 
growth. The addition o f  IPO type dummies in column 6 adds incremental explanatory 
power. The start-up dummy is significantly positive in every regression in which it 
appears, indicating that these firms exhibit greater growth options that mature IPOs. 
The roll-up dummy is always negative and marginally significant with p-values 
ranging from 0.082 to 0.106. This decrease in growth for roll-ups is partly caused by 
the significantly larger book value of assets found in these firms. The risk proxy, 
volatility o f stock returns, is significantly positive, indicating that increases in 
volatility are linked to higher growth and vice versa (also see Table 11).
A comparison o f  results using two different risk proxies is presented in Table 10. 
The proxies are (1) the SEC mandated risk factors (ex ante risk) and (2) volatility (ex 
post risk). Columns 1, 2, and 4 of Table 10 are the same as columns 1, 5, and 6 from 
Table 9. Volatility (columns 2 and 4) is an ex post measure, so it includes more 
information than the ex ante measure, number o f risk factors (columns 3 and 5). The 
number o f  risk factors is not significant in either regression, indicating that it has little
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Research and development 18 0 9 27
(50%) (0%) (16%)
Exercisine Growth Ontions
Working capital and general 35 13 47 95
corporate purposes (97%) (72%) (82%)
Capital expenditures 23 7 28 58
(64%) (39%) (49%)
Possible future acquisitions 16 9 29 54
(44%) (50%) (51%)
Sales and marketing 16 0 10 26
(44%) (0%) (18%)
Current acquisitions & geographic 2 10 7 19
expansion (5%) (56%) (12%)
Retirine Debt
Retire debt 15 18 42 75
(42%) (100%) (74%)
Redeem stock 1 3 10 14
(3%) (17%) (18%)
Other Uses
S-Corporation distributions I I 8 10
& founders' bonuses (3%) (5%) (14%)
Security for letter o f credit I I 0 2
or lease (3%) (5%) (0%)
Preferred dividends 0 0 I I
(0%) (0%) (2%)
Reorganization costs 0 I 0 1
(0%) (5%) (0%)
l firm discloses their planned usage o f  proceeds from the offering. 'he numb
uses for individual firms ranges from 1 to 7.
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Table 9: Relation of Growth Proxy to Uses o f Proceeds, Risk, and IPO Type
Dummies





















































































P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise. 






Firms are creating growth options: includes uses of proceeds for R&D. 
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures, 
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and 
marketing.
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of credit, 
reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred dividends.
Risk proxy: volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns. 
The number of months range from 9 to 30.
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(Table 9 continued)
DR = Dummy for roll-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
DS = Dummy for start-up firms is I, 0 otherwise.
Note: For each firm, the disclosure of a specific use of proceeds is coded I, and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, if an individual firm specified several uses included in the XGO grouping, the 
XGO variable for that firm is the sum of the coded ones (I).
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Table 10: Relation o f Growth Proxy to Uses o f Proceeds, Risk, and IPO Type
Dummies: Comparison of Two Risk Proxies































































































P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise. 






Firms are creating growth options: includes uses of proceeds for R&D. 
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures, 
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and 
marketing.
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of credit, 
reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred dividends. 
Columns 2 and 4: Volatility of post-IPO monthly stock returns; columns 3 
and 5: Number of risk factors disclosed in prospectus.
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(Table 10 continued)
DS = Dummy for start-up firms is 1,0 otherwise.
DR = Dummy for roll-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
Note: For each firm, the disclosure of a specific use of proceeds is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, if an individual firm specified several uses included in the XGO grouping, the 
XGO variable for that firm is the sum of the coded ones (1).
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explanatory power for growth. As expected, volatility, which contains the most 
information, does a much better job o f explaining the variation in growth.
4.2.1 Risk and Proceeds
Results from examining the relations among ex post risk, ex ante risk, and 
growth are presented in Table 11. Volatility (ex post risk) is regressed on growth, the 
uses of proceeds categories, and the number o f risk factors. Several issues are 
examined: (I) the predictive power o f  SEC’s required disclosure o f  risk factors, (2) 
the change in the predictive power o f these risk factors over time, and (3) the 
predictive power o f growth and the uses o f proceeds categories.
The number o f risk factors (ex ante risk) is useful in predicting ex post risk. 
This result holds both for Ritter’s (1991) older sample (column 1, Table 11) and for 
this recent sample o f IPOs (column 2, Table 11). Over the years, the SEC’s policy has 
changed about which risk factors to disclose, i.e., whether firms should include risk 
factors that apply to all firms. The current sample includes many risk factors that 
apply to all firms and this change has diminished the predictive power of this ex ante 
risk measure (based on the decline in R2 in columns 1 and 2). This result has 
implications for policy-makers and investors.
Results shown in column 4 o f Table 11 indicate that the uses o f proceeds 
categories are not significant in explaining volatility. The growth proxy, however, 
does have predictive power. This result supports the efficient markets hypothesis, i.e., 
the market value o f the firm (numerator o f  the proxy) reflects all available information 
and the market to book measure is a useful predictor o f  future stock return volatility.
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Table 11: Relation o f R isk to Growth and Proceeds













































0.249 0.146 0.244 0.235
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.020 0.030 0.771
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise. 







Ex post risk proxy measured as the standard deviation o f monthly 
stock returns. The number of months range from 9 to 30.
From Ritter’s (1991) IPO database of 1,526 firms for 1974-1983.
(MV Equity + BV Debt) / BV Assets.
Firms are creating growth options: includes uses of proceeds for 
R&D.
Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for 
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures, 
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and 
marketing.
Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
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(Table 11 continued)
OTHER = Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of
credit, reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred 
dividends.
RISK FACTORS = Number of risk factors disclosed in the prospectus.
Note: For each firm, the disclosure of a specific use of proceeds is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, if an individual firm specified several uses included in the XGO grouping, the 
XGO variable for that firm is the sum of the coded ones (1).
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4 3  Compensation
Details regarding the disclosures o f bonus plan information and methods of 
performance evaluation are presented in Table 12. Only 16 firms disclose an 
accounting metric used for cash bonuses. O f these sixteen firms, eleven (81.3%) are 
classified as mature (two are roll-ups) and three (18.7%) are start-ups. This supports 
the argument that accounting measures are more useful in mature firms than in start­
ups and that IPOs are not homogeneous.
Eighty-three firms in Table 12 list the basis o f performance evaluation as either 
(a) unspecified financial and other benchmarks, (b) unspecified performance 
objectives, or (c) no disclosure. It is possible that these 83 firms use non-financial 
performance measures.17 The evidence, though, shows that the explicit performance 
evaluation criteria are accounting-based (one firm uses shareholder return).
Testable hypotheses related to CEO compensation are developed in Section 2.3, 
summarized in Table I, and summary results reported in Table 19. In general, these 
hypotheses test whether: (1) compensation is related to growth and other IOS
measures, such as size, risk, and performance; (2) compensation is related to CEO 
characteristics; and (3) compensation is related to IPO classifications. The full 
empirical model for testing compensation hypotheses is:
17 Studies examining the use o f non-financial performance incentives find that accounting data and stock 
prices are not sufficient measures of CEO performance for some firms [Bushman et al. (1996)]. 
However, two-thirds o f the Bushman et al. (1996) sample firms report no weight on CEO non-financial 
individual performance. Examples of non-financial performance measures include market share, 
efficiency or productivity, product quality, customer satisfaction, and employee satisfaction [Inner, 
Larcker, and Raj an (1997)].
63
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
COMPi =  p0 +  Pi SIZE + p2 GROWTH + p3 ROA + p4 RISK + p5CEOCOB
+ p6 CEOOWN + p7 DIROWN + pg TENURE +  p9 FOUNDER + Pio DR















Various measures o f CEO compensation (prior year 
salary, salary per employment agreement, prior year bonus, 
bonus as a  proportion o f  cash compensation, and value o f stock 
options).
Sales.
(Market value of equity + Book value o f debt)/Book 
value o f  assets.
(Net income/Book value o f  assets).
Volatility: Standard deviation o f  post-IPO monthly 
stock returns for 9 to 30 months.
1 if  CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-DPO) of directors and 
officers (excluding CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if  CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
1 if  firm is a roll-up, 0 otherwise.
1 if  firm is a start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Table 12: Distribution o f Cash Bonus Plan Disclosures
Frequency
Disclosures found in firms with cash bonus plans (100 firms):
Bonus based on a percentage of base salary 23
Bonus target disclosed 12
Maximum bonus disclosed 29
Minimum bonus disclosed 10




Earnings before taxes, depreciation, and amortization 2
Pretax income before extraordinary items 2




Unspecified financial and other benchmarks 7
Unspecified performance objectives 69
Not disclosed 7 83
100
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Results from the compensation regressions are presented in Tables 13 through 
18 and summarized in Table 19. To avoid spurious proxy effects, the discussion of 
results emphasizes regressions that include all variables.
Size is significantly positive in both salary regressions (Tables 13 and 14), which 
supports previous findings that CEOs o f  larger firms have higher compensation. The 
reasoning is that larger firms are more complex and more difficult to manage.
The lack o f a  relation between growth and salaries (Tables 13 and 14) is the 
opposite o f findings by Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Baber et al. (1996). The growth 
measure used in Baber et al. (1996) is positive and significant only for salaries, 
indicating that executives in firms with high levels o f investment opportunities receive 
higher salaries. Gaver and Gaver (1993) find that executives in growth firms are paid 
more total compensation.18 These conflicting results may partly be due to the different 
growth proxies used in these studies. Both of these studies use factor analysis to 
distinguish higher growth firms from lower growth firms. The use o f these factors 
results in the Gavers’ growth firms being large, profitable companies that dominate 
their product markets. Their description o f growth firms is the opposite o f the growth 
IPOs in this study.
Firm performance is theoretically linked to incentive compensation, but not to 
fixed compensation (salary). The prediction that ROA has no effect on salary levels is 
supported by the data (Tables 13 and 14). Other studies have found mixed results for
18 Gaver and Gaver’s (1993) measure o f total compensation is the average cash compensation (salary 
and bonus) received by the top five executives.
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risk proxies included in compensation regressions. The prediction made is that CEO 
salary is higher for riskier firms due to risk aversion and thus, demands for a  risk 
premium. This salary prediction is supported for prior year salary presented in 
columns 3 and 4 o f  Table 13. Note that both o f these models include CEO 
characteristics. The models in columns 3 and 4, which include CEO characteristics, 
may be better specified, thus the positive, significant coefficient on risk. In contrast, 
risk does not have any explanatory power for any o f the regressions in Table 14 (base 
salary per employment agreement).
Results from the inclusion o f certain CEO characteristics and ownership 
variables are mixed. For this sample, the fact that the CEO is also the Chairman o f the 
Board does not make any difference in compensation levels (Tables 13 and 14). This 
result is opposite to the findings in Cyert et al. (1997) and Core et al. (1999).
As predicted, CEOs receive more salary as their ownership increases (Tables 13 
and 14). This result supports the assertion that CEOs receive risk premiums in the 
form o f salary when their equity ownership placed large amounts o f  firm risk on them.
Ownership by officers and directors, other than the CEO, is expected to give 
board members an incentive to monitor directly. Therefore, it is possible that CEO 
incentives such as bonuses and stock options are not as necessary for evaluation 
purposes. As expected, results indicate that director and officer ownership is 
insignificant for CEO salary (Tables 13 and 14).
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The argument that salary Is increasing in CEO tenure is supported in Tables 13 
and 14. Increased salary may be a  reward for staying with the firm and acquiring the 
human capital necessary.
Whether the CEO is a  founder appears to make a difference in salary levels and 
its effect is negative. Coefficients on these variables indicate that founders receive 
$63,000-65,000 less than non-founders (Table 13). For employment agreement 
salaries (Table 14), salaries are about $59,000 lower for founders. These results are 
inconsistent with CEO opportunism. That is, the results are inconsistent with CEOs 
using their “power” to extract “excessive” compensation from the firm.
The type o f IPO only seems to make a  difference in one o f the salary regressions. 
This is a  regression of salary per employment agreement and involves roll-ups 
(column 2, Table 14). This forward-looking salary amount is significantly negative for 
roll-ups, indicating that these types o f  IPOs contract for lower base salaries than other 
mature firms. It may be possible that the incentive component for roll-ups is greater 
and a trade-off between fixed and incentive compensation is being made. This 
possibility cannot be determined based on the data available.
As found in the salary regressions, CEOs o f  larger firms receive higher bonuses 
and growth has no explanatory value (Tables 15 and 17). The association between 
incentive compensation and firm performance has been well documented. Cash 
bonuses for large firm samples are tied to firm performance, which is usually 
measured by an accounting metric. In Table 15, ROA is significantly positive 
(p=0.075) in only one bonus regression (column 1). This result may be due to the
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Prob(White Statistic) 0.640 0.725 0.786 0.691
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise. 
a Two outlying observations are deleted.
Salary = Prior year cash salary.
SIZE = Sales.
GROWTH = (Market value o f equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets.
ROA -  Net income/book value o f assets.
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(Table 13 continued)
RISK Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30 
months for individual firms.
CEOCOB 1 if CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEOOWN = CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
DIROWN = Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) of directors and officers (excluding 
CEO).
TENURE CEO tenure in years.
FOUNDER = 1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
DR 1 if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
DS I if start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Prob(White Statistic) 0.526 0.716 0.569 0.697
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-taiied and two-tailed otherwise. 
" Two outlying observations are deleted.
Salagree = CEO base salary per employment agreement.
SIZE = Sales.
GROWTH = (Market value o f equity + book value o f debt)/book value of assets.
ROA = Net income/book value o f assets.
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(Table 14 continued)
RISK Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30 
months for individual firms.
CEOCOB 1 if  CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEOOWN = CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
DIROWN Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) of directors and officers (excluding 
CEO).
TENURE CEO tenure in years.
FOUNDER = 1 if  CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
DR 1 if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
DS 1 if  start-up, 0 otherwise.
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unique characteristics o f  IPOs and the fact that many o f  these firms are experiencing 
poor accounting performance, but still pay out bonuses. Another explanation is related 
to the model specifications in the table. The model in column 1 does not include any 
CEO characteristics variables or the classification dummies (intercept dummies). The 
addition o f the classification dummies, DR and DS, in column 2 reduces the 
coefficient and significance o f ROA, and the dummies are significantly negative. In 
the bonus proportion regressions o f Table 17, ROA is only significant in one 
regression (column 4) and it is negative (p-value = 0.079). This result must be due to 
differences in model specifications.
It is asserted that firm performance may be more closely related to incentive 
compensation for large firms with considerable assets-in-place. To test this, the 
sample is sorted by size (sales) and separated into thirds. Interaction terms (slope 
dummies) are created for the smallest third (ROA*SMALL) and the largest third 
(ROA*LARGE). Tables 15 and 17 include results from using the interaction o f these 
dummies with ROA. Columns 5 and 6 in both tables indicate that ROA is more useful 
and has a stronger and positive relation with bonuses for the largest firms. The 
relation with ROA for the smallest firms does not appear to be significantly different 
from the relation found in medium-sized firms (ROA without any interaction). This 
result confirms that accounting numbers are more useful as a performance evaluation 
tool in larger firms. Pne significant coefficient for ROA*LARGE in columns 5 and 6 
also reveals that even if  these firms do not specify the performance evaluation criteria 
they use, i.e., whether it is accounting based or not, there are ties between bonuses and
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accounting return. An unexpected significant coefficient for the dummy, 
ROA*SMALL in column 4 o f  Table 17, may be related to model specification for 
bonus proportions, since the significance declines when the model includes CEO 
characteristic variables.
The only CEO characteristic or ownership variable that is consistently 
significant for both bonuses and bonus proportion regressions is the equity ownership 
o f officers and directors (Tables 15 and 17). Ownership by officers and directors, 
other than the CEO, is expected to give board members an incentive to monitor 
directly. Therefore, it is possible that CEO incentives such as bonuses and stock 
options are not as necessary for evaluation purposes so ownership doesn’t matter. The 
results, though, indicate that director and officer ownership does have explanatory 
power for CEO bonuses. The coefficient is positive, indicating that bonuses are 
increasing in the ownership by officers and directors. This indicates that as this type 
o f ownership increases, there is a  shift towards performance-related compensation.
One exception to the lack o f significance for CEO characteristics other than 
directors’ ownership is found in one o f the bonus regressions (column 6, Table 15). 
CEOCOB is significantly positive (p-value = 0.080), but only when the model includes 
the interactions between ROA and size. There doesn’t  appear to be an intuitive 
explanation for this result.
In contrast to the salary results, IPO types are significant in explaining the 
variation in CEO bonuses. Both the roll-up and start-up intercept dummies are 
negative, indicating that cash incentive compensation (bonuses) for these types o f
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firms is significantly lower than that o f  other mature firms. It may be that these firms 
substitute stock-based incentives for cash incentives.
The components o f  cash compensation (salary plus bonus) are combined for 
regressions presented in Table 16. This analysis is presented because this is the 
definition o f compensation used in other studies. The results document the confusing 
results that this combination causes. The underlying theory o f  fixed compensation 
versus cash incentive compensation (bonuses) differs, making it difficult to predict the 
directional effect o f explanatory variables. The direction depends on the strength o f 
the two components. Therefore, examination of the results in Table 16 do not support 
all the predictions for salary (Tables 13 and 14) or bonus (Tables 15 and 17).
As predicted, size is not significant for stock option values (Table 18). Stock- 
based incentives are used as substitutes for eamings-based incentives in firms with low 
or negative earnings. Growth options, not size, drive this substitution. Thus, the 
growth proxy, market to book, is significantly positive in the stock option value 
regressions (Table 18), but not in the salary or bonus compensation regressions. This 
result supports the prediction that stock-based compensation is greater in firms with 
larger proportions o f  growth options. The reasoning is that it is harder to monitor 
managers o f high growth firms, partly because accounting performance measures are 
less useful. If these firms have high initial operating costs, or if  they are investing in 
R&D and/or advertising, then the requirement that these types o f expenditures be 
expensed causes net income to be low or negative. One way to provide an ex ante 
incentive for CEOs to maximize firm value is to grant stock options. As the value o f
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CEOCOB + 29,175 



























































Prob (White Statistic) 0.307 0.371 0.969 0.890 0.987 0.578
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise.
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(Table 15 continued)















Prior year cash bonus.
Sales.
(Market value o f equity + book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
Interaction term; SMALL is I if  the size (sales) o f the firm is in the smallest third 
o f the distribution, 0 otherwise.
Net income/book value o f assets.
Interaction term; LARGE is 1 if  the size (sales) o f the firm is in the largest third o f 
the distribution, 0 otherwise.
Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30 
months for individual firms.
I if  CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO e q u ity  ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding 
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
I if  CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
I if roll-up, 0 otherwise.
I if  start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Prob (White Statistic) 0.187 0.743
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed except for one-tailed tests on SIZE and 
CEOCOB.
a Three outlying observations are deleted.
Cashcomp = Prior year salary plus prior year cash bonus.
SIZE = Sales.
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(Market value o f  equity +■ book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
Net income/book value o f assets.
Standard deviation o f monthly stock returns. These range from 9 to 30 months for 
individual firms.
1 if  CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding 
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
I if  roll-up, 0 otherwise.
I o f start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Prob(White Statistic) 0.089 0.243 0.679 0.689 0.511
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(Table 17 continued)
P-value o f t-statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise. 
1 Five outlying observations are deleted.
Bonus Prop = Prior year cash bonus /  (prior year cash salary +- bonus).
SIZE Sales.
GROWTH = (Market value o f equity +- book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
ROA*SMALL= Interaction term; SMALL is I if  the size (sales) o f the firm is in the smallest third
of the distribution, 0 otherwise.
ROA Net income/book value o f assets.
ROA*LARGE= Interaction term; LARGE is 1 if  the size (sales) o f the firm is in the largest third o f
the distribution, 0 otherwise.
RISK Standard deviation o f monthly stock returns.
CEOCOB 1 if  CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEOOWN = CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
DIROWN Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding
CEO).
TENURE CEO tenure in years.
FOUNDER = 1 if CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
DR I if  roll-up, 0 otherwise.
DS I if  start-up, 0 otherwise.
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Prob(White Statistic) 0.835 0.584 0.941 0.616 0.900
P-value of t statistics are in parentheses. Signed tests are one-tailed and two-tailed otherwise. 
a Three outlying observations are deleted.
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Sum o f in-the-money value o f exercisable stock options (at IPO price) and the 
Black-Scholes (1973) value o f unexercisable stock options (modified for early 
exercise).
Sales.
(Market value o f equity + book value o f debt)/book value o f assets.
Net income/book value o f assets.
Standard deviation o f post-IPO monthly stock returns. These returns range from 9 
to 30 months for individual firms.
I if  CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) o f directors and officers (excluding 
CEO).
CEO tenure in years.
1 if  CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
1 if  roll-up, 0 otherwise.
I if  start-up, 0 otherwise.
Interaction term.
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the firm increases, the CEO receives an ex post reward as the cash value o f  their 
options and the underlying stock increases. They can then increase their wealth by 
cashing out when the options are in the money.
The firm performance variable, ROA, is not significantly different from zero 
except in column 4 o f Table 18. This particular regression includes all CEO 
characteristic and ownership variables and the IPO type dummies. A firm’s stock 
value is expected to be higher if  that firm has performed well in the past. To test 
whether there is a relation between ROA and the IPO type dummies, an interaction 
term (slope dummy), ROA*DS, is included in the regression in column 5 o f Table 18. 
ROA becomes insignificant, but the interaction term is significant with a large positive 
coefficient. The start-up dummy becomes more significant also. This is counter to 
intuition about start-ups and the usefulness o f performance measured with accounting 
numbers (p-value decreases from 0.114 to 0.038). It is possible that the value o f  stock 
options performs differently from the change in the value o f  stock options as a 
measure o f stock-based compensation for a given year.
CEO ownership is predicted to be negatively related to stock option values. This 
prediction is based on the premise that the more equity ownership the CEO has, the 
more he or she is aligned with the incentives of stockholders and less stock-based 
incentive compensation is needed. Results indicate that the equity ownership o f  the 
CEO has no effect on stock option values. The equity ownership o f officers and 
directors doesn’t have an effect on stock option values either. As predicted, risk, 
whether the CEO is also Chairman o f the Board, and the CEO’s tenure has no effect in
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the stock option value regressions. Whether the CEO is a founder makes no difference 
either.
In summary, the classification o f  IPOs into three types (other mature firms, roll­
ups, and start-ups) has explanatory value in the compensation tests. Classification as a 
roll-up has a  negative effect on salary per the employment agreement and bonus levels 
and proportions. As found with roll-ups, CEOs o f  start-ups also have lower cash 
bonuses (levels and proportions). Startups do not differ from mature firms for salary 
levels, but stock option values are significantly greater than those found other types o f 
IPOs. These high growth firms are using more stock option incentives and less bonus 
incentives.
Overall, the results (see summary Table 19) indicate that CEO base salaries are 
increasing in the size o f the firm, CEO equity ownership, and CEO tenure, but 
decreasing when the CEO is also a founder. Salaries for roll-ups and start-ups are not 
significantly different from those o f other mature firms. Cash incentive compensation 
(bonuses) is found to be increasing in size and officers’ and directors’ equity 
ownership but decreasing for roll-ups and start-ups. In addition, ROA for the largest 
one-third o f sample firms is positively associated with cash bonuses. As expected, 
stock option values are increasing in growth opportunities, especially for start-up 
firms. Broadly, the results are consistent with efficient contracting and inconsistent 
with CEO opportunism.
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Table 19: Summary of Compensation Results
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
Sa ary Bonus Stock Options
Pred. Sien Sien Found Pred. Sien Sien Found Pred. Sien Sien Found
IOS |
Size (Sales) + + I ' + + 0 0
Growth 0 0 I 0 0 + +
Firm performance (ROA) 0 0 |  0/+ 0/+ + 0/+
Risk (Volatility) + + 1 0 0 0 0
1
CEO Characteristics & Ownership 1
CEO is chairman of the board + 0 + + 0 0
CEO ownership + 0 0 - 0
Directors’ & officers’ ownership 0 0 0 + - 0
CEO tenure + + 0 0 0 0
CEO is a founder ? - ? 0 ? 0
IPO Type
Roll-up + 0 II 0 - 0 0
Start-up 0 o 1 - + +
8 Sign found is for the full model without interaction terms. For salary, this is column 4 of Table 13; for bonus, column 6 of Table IS; and 
for stock option values, column 4 of Table 18.
Pred. sign = “0” indicates that the estimate is not expected to be statistically different from zero.
Pred. sign = “?” indicates that no prediction is m ade about the direction o f  the effect.
4.4 Sensitivity Analyses
This section discusses the procedures used to identify outliers in  the data and 
alternative measures and specifications. First, regressions are run with all observations 
included. Studentized residuals are examined to identify possible outliers. For each 
dependent variable, dummy variables are formed for each observation that has a 
studentized residual greater than or equal to two. This technique allows the detection 
o f outliers using variable selection techniques [Peixoto and LaMotte (1989)]. Based 
on the results o f an R2 variable selection procedure, one to five observations are 
deleted for each dependent variable prior to performing any o f  the reported 
compensation tests. A comparison o f  the reported results with those that include the 
influential observations indicate that some signs change, significant coefficients 
become insignificant and vice versa, and the magnitude of coefficients differ.
4.4.1 Growth Proxies and Industry Effects
Several alternative growth proxies are tested in the growth and use o f proceeds 
regressions. The proxies are: (1) same growth proxy used in the study except that 
redeemable stock is excluded from the numerator, (2) same growth proxy used in the 
study except that only long-term liabilities are added to market value o f  equity in the 
numerator, (3) same as (2) above, except that redeemable stock is excluded from long­
term liabilities, (4) proceeds / book value o f assets, and (5) (book value o f equity + 
proceeds) / book value of assets. Results from these regressions are not qualitatively 
different from the market to book measure reported in the tables.
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Ely (1991) finds that firms in the same industry face similar production 
environments and therefore have similar IOS. Industry membership for each firm is 
tabulated, resulting in eleven industry dummy variables. These dummies are included 
in the growth regressions to test whether any additional IOS characteristics are picked 
up by industry membership. Results o f  F tests from these regressions indicate that 
industry dummies are not jointly significantly different from zero (p-value=0.427), 
whereas the theory variables, CGO, XGO, RETDEBT, and OTHER, have a joint 
significance level o f p=0.023. Therefore, the variables are not just picking up 
“industry” effects.
Interactions between the theory variables, CGO, XGO, RETDEBT, and OTHER, 
and the roll-up and start-up dummies are also tested. None o f the interaction terms are 
individually significant and the explanatory power o f the model doesn’t differ 
qualitatively from the results reported.
Since the total number o f uses o f  proceeds has been used as a  proxy o f  ex ante 
uncertainty, this variable is substituted for risk factors in the growth regressions to see 
how its explanatory power compares with volatility. The coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero.
4.4.2 Compensation, Industry Effects, and Performance Evaluation
For compensation regressions, sensitivity tests on two alternate size proxies, 
book value of assets and log o f sales, are performed. Using book value o f  assets or log 
o f sales instead o f  sales as the size proxy does not change the results qualitatively. 
When log of sales is used, the model explains less of the variation in salary than does
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the use o f  sales (R2 decreases by .15), but the log does a  better job explaining variation 
in the stock option value model (R2 increases by .33). The use o f log o f sales in the 
tests causes the condition numbers in each regression to be about 28, indicating some 
degree o f collinearity with the intercept.
Compensation hypotheses are also tested with industry membership included. 
Ely (1991) finds that firms in the same industry face similar production environments 
and therefore have similar IOS. Thus, including industry dummies in the tests controls 
for differences in the demand for managerial talent [Cyert, et al. (1997)]. Two-digit 
SIC codes are used to proxy for industry membership.
Ten industry dummies are included in the models to see if  industry membership 
has any explanatory power, which would imply that the models are misspecified if
•y
they are not included. Adjusted R  decreases when the industry dummies are included, 
and an F test on the dummies indicates than they are not jointly significantly different 
from zero.
Some firms did not pay cash bonuses. The bonus variable for these firms is 
coded zero because that is the true value. This differs from observations that have 
missing values. To test whether firms with zero bonuses affect the inferences, these 
zero bonus firms are excluded. The bonus regressions are rerun and compared with 
regressions that include the firms with zero bonuses. Results indicate that bonus levels 
are not sensitive to excluding zero values.
Tests are run to see if  growth and IPO types have any explanatory power for the 
types o f  performance evaluation used for cash bonuses. First, performance criteria is
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split between firms that disclose the use o f an accounting metric and those that did not. 
Second, performance criteria is separated into three categories, (I) firms that disclose 
accounting performance usage, (2) those that specify financial and other benchmarks, 
and (3) firms that disclose only unspecified performance objectives. None o f  the 
variables in these regressions are significantly different from zero, individually or as a 
group.
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5. SUMMARY, BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF SAMPLE, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH
This study examines the components o f  CEO compensation for IPOs. Testing 
salary, bonus, and stock options separately provides more powerful tests than studies 
that combine these components. This is because the theory underlying the various 
components varies depending on whether the component is fixed, a  short-term cash 
incentive or a  long-term stock incentive. Unlike previous studies, this study does not 
assume that IPOs are homogeneous, but that IPOs, and hence their contracts, vary with 
firm characteristics. Results from a  sample o f 111 IPOs support this prediction. 
Further, this study documents the nature o f an interesting subset o f IPOs: roll-ups. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that roll-ups differ from other IPOs in several ways. 
These differences provide insight into their IOS and contracting constraints.
First, this study finds that there are considerable cross-sectional differences 
among firm characteristics o f  IPOs. Second, the equity ownership retained by CEOs 
and other officers and directors is much higher than found in large firm samples, 
which means that IPOs have a substitute monitoring mechanism. The high ownership 
provides an incentive for board members to collect the data necessary for more direct 
monitoring. Third, IPOs have substantial growth opportunities. Median market to 
book for IPOs in this sample is over five times the book value o f assets. In contrast, 
median growth opportunities for 450 large firms (Forbes) in Bizjak et al. (1993) is 
0.67 o f  book value. The large difference between the two studies may be partly due to
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book value for IPOs being a  poor proxy for the present value o f  future cash flows from 
assets in place.
This paper argues that accounting numbers are less useful as monitoring or 
incentive devices for IPOs. This argument is supported by: (I) the fact that start-ups 
have low or negative earnings, yet CEOs still receive bonuses, (2) the lack o f  explicit 
wording in employment contracts regarding how bonuses are derived, and (3) the 
evidence that firm performance (ROA) is positively linked for only the largest firms. 
It appears that boards o f directors take into account the low or negative earnings o f 
many IPOs and they retain discretion in making bonus awards. Additionally, the large 
equity ownership o f CEOs and other officers and directors indicates that incentives to 
maximize value exist, so more direct monitoring mechanisms are unnecessary.
Further, this study documents departures from findings in large firm 
compensation studies. This study finds that higher growth firms do not pay higher 
salaries and bonuses or that CEOs who are also Chairman o f  the Board receive higher 
compensation. Overall, the results are consistent with efficient contracting and 
inconsistent with CEO opportunism.
5.1 Benefits and Limitations of Sample
There are several limitations and benefits associated with this study. First, using 
a sample o f  IPO firms imposes a small firm bias and decreases the generalizability of 
the results. This problem with generalization o f  inferences also applies to IPOs in 
other time periods due to the documented "hot and cold" IPO markets. On the other 
hand, the benefit o f using an IPO sample is that we leam something about
92
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
compensation contracting for a sample o f  firms largely ignored in the literature. Large 
firm samples may represent most o f the market capitalization, but they do not 
represent the majority o f  compensation contracts for publicly-traded firms.
Second, using proxies to measure theoretical constructs introduces measurement 
error. This is especially true for growth opportunities and business risk. Using a 
sample o f younger firms, though, may lessen the measurement error in the growth 
proxy. In addition, disclosure o f the planned uses o f  proceeds from the IPO offers a 
unique opportunity to incorporate additional growth information. Also, few samples 
provide both an ex ante and ex post measure o f risk, as documented here.
Third, executive compensation, growth opportunities, risk, firm performance, 
corporate governance, and size are endogenous. Modeling any of these variables is 
problematic since they are internal to the firm and underlying exogenous factors are 
difficult to identify.
5.2 Future Research
Examination o f contracts for smaller and younger firms offers an opportunity to 
document the development o f  these firms. Future research can analyze the changes in 
IOS and its relation to compensation contracts as these firms grow and as the time 
subsequent to the IPO lengthens. Following a set o f IPOs over time allows (1) a 
longer series o f stock returns for computing volatility, (2) documentation o f  the 
manner in which the firm grows, (3) examination o f  accounting performance measures 
disclosed for changing contracts, and (4) computation o f changes in compensation 
levels from year to year.
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Another task in compensation research is to find better ways o f modeling the 
endogeneity o f  compensation, IOS, CEO characteristics, and corporate governance 
proxies. A simultaneous system o f  equations underlies the structure and is needed to 
properly test these relations.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Name Definition
BONUS Prior year cash bonus.
BONUS PROP Prior year cash bonus as a proportion of prior year cash compensation 
(salary plus bonus).
CASHCOMP Prior year cash salary plus prior year cash bonus.
CEOCOB 1 if  CEO is also Chairman of the Board, 0 otherwise.
CEOOWN CEO equity ownership percentage (post-IPO).
CGO Firms are creating growth options: includes uses o f proceeds for R&D.
DIROWN Equity ownership percentage (post-IPO) of directors and officers 
(excluding CEO).
DR Intercept dummy for roll-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
DS Intercept dummy for start-ups is 1,0 otherwise.
FOUNDER 1 if  CEO is a founder, 0 otherwise.
GROWTH (Market value of equity + book value of debt)/book value of assets.
OTHER Firms are using proceeds for S-corporation distributions, letters of credit, 
reorganization costs, bonuses for founders, and preferred dividends.
RETDEBT Firms are retiring debt including redeemable stock.
RISK FACTORS Number of risk factors disclosed in prospectus.
RISK (VOL) Volatility: standard deviation of post-IPO monthly stock returns.
ROA Net income/book value of assets.
ROA*DS Interaction term with ROA and start-up dummy.
ROA*SMALL Interaction term; SMALL is 1 if the size (sales) of the firm is in the 
smallest third of the distribution, 0 otherwise.
ROA*LARGE Interaction term; LARGE is 1 if the size (sales) of the firm is in the 
largest third of the distribution, 0 otherwise.
SALARY Prior years cash salary.
SALAGREE Base salary per employment agreement.
SIZE Sales.
SO VALUE Sum of in-the-money value of exercisable stock options (at IPO price) 
and the Black-Scholes (1973) value of unexercisable stock options 
(modified for early exercise).
TENURE CEO tenure in years.
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of post-IPO monthly stock returns.
XGO Firms are exercising growth options: includes uses of proceeds for 
working capital and general corporate purposes, capital expenditures, 
geographic expansion, current and future acquisitions, and sales and 
marketing.
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